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Abstract 
  
The thesis consists of three chapters with Chapters 2 and 3 providing experimental 
evidence on the role of cheap-talk and a third party recommendation in reducing or 
aggravating conflict. 
 
Chapter 1 surveys the theoretical, empirical and experimental literature on the 
determinants of conflict. 
 
Chapter 2 considers an experiment based on Baliga and Sjostrom (BS, 2004) to 
investigate whether communication reduces the probability of an arms race. We 
find that communication does indeed reduce the possibility of using strategies that 
lead to an arms race, even when the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium without 
communication has both players playing a strategy that leads to an arms race. 
 
Chapter 3 considers a set of experiments based on Baliga and Sjostrom (BS, 2012) 
to understand if third parties can provoke conflict. We adapt their model to 
experimentally test if a third party recommendation can trigger conflict. While in 
some treatments with recommendation, more players do choose an aggressive 
strategy compared to the treatment without, none of them are statistically 
significant. We propose a number of explanations for why provocation may not 
necessarily increase conflict in this environment. 
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Summary of Chapters 
 
The thesis consists of three chapters with Chapters 2 and 3 providing experimental 
evidence on the role of cheap-talk and a third party recommendation in reducing or 
aggravating conflict. 
 
Chapter 1 surveys the theoretical, empirical and experimental literature on the 
determinants of conflict. 
 
Chapter 2 considers an experiment based on Baliga and Sjostrom (BS, 2004). They build 
a model of an arms race where the players’ propensity to arm is private information and 
find that if a ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
involving an arms race with probability one. However, they show that there exists an 
equilibrium in a cheap-talk extension where the probability of an arms race is close to 
zero. We adapt the Baliga Sjostrom framework to conduct an experiment to investigate 
whether when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, cheap-talk reduces the probability of an 
arms race. We find that communication does indeed reduce the possibility of using 
strategies that lead to an arms race, when players can engage in pre-play communication, 
even when there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium without communication where 
both players play a strategy that leads to an arms race. 
 
Chapter 3 considers a set of experiments based on Baliga and Sjostrom (BS, 2012) to 
understand if third parties can provoke conflict. BS analyse a stag hunt game of 
incomplete information and find that when actions are strategic complements, there exists 
an equilibrium when a third party message can increase the probability of conflict by 
triggering some players to switch from a non-aggressive to an aggressive strategy. We 
adapt a discrete version of the BS model to experimentally test if a third party 
recommendation can trigger conflict. While in some treatments with recommendation, 
more players do choose an aggressive strategy compared to the treatment without, none of 
them are statistically significant. This may occur for a variety of reasons: players may 
simply be playing a ‘babbling’ equilibrium and ignoring recommendations or the payoff 
pair from the non-aggressive strategy may look like a ‘safe strategy’ with implicit co-
ordination between players, they may be inequality averse or they might be playing the 
socially optimal outcome. 
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Introduction 
 
History provides many examples where fear and distrust, sparked by uncertainty 
about the opponent’s motives, appears to have triggered arms races. In the 
Peloponnesian War, Sparta and its allies interpreted a treaty of mutual protection 
between Athens and Corcyra as an act of provocation. Although the Athenians and 
Spartans had been opposed to one another for many years prior, the treaty caused 
Sparta to cancel its peace treaty with Athens and the war began in 431BC when 
Sparta’s ally, Thebes, tried to seize Potidea. A lack of trust in Germany, caused 
Britain to join the war against them in World War I. Belgium ports were close to the 
British coast and the German control was a threat. The Cold War was based on a 
situation of distrust between the Soviet Union and the Allied Powers, just as the India-
Pakistan arms race is between India and Pakistan. The growing literature on what 
provokes conflict or causes an escalation is mixed. This thesis contributes to the 
understanding of conflict and the role of communication in escalating and 
deescalating aggression between players. 
 
Experimental methods within laboratories are applied for three purposes (Garfinkel 
and Skaperdas, 2012). Firstly, they can check theoretical models. They permit us to 
observe behaviour and enable us to capture the psychology underpinning theory more 
successfully. Secondly, they can substitute field data that is often unavailable, 
particularly when studying a topic such as conflict. Lastly, even in situations where 
some field data is available, laboratory data can be gathered in tandem with field data. 
This is strongly complementary as one method’s weakness is compensated by the 
other’s strengths. Field data is gathered in real life and is therefore more realistic. 
However, it suffers from noise, identification problems and a lack of control. On the 
other hand, laboratory data allows the use of a controlled environment so we can test 
variations of individual factors, keeping all others constant - endogeneity problems do 
not arise. We conduct analysis in a controlled setting such as this to isolate the role of 
fear in the propagation of conflict. 
 
The best possible scenario would be to have a combination of theory, field data and 
laboratory data, all in support of each other, and we hope to contribute in this way. 
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The role of private information is currently a fundamental issue. There are studies 
such as Levy (2004) and Ottaviani and Sorenson (2006) where there exists 
asymmetric information on key parameters, in order to gain a competitive advantage 
against their opponent. Our research in Chapter Two contributes to this area. There is 
also a growing interest in the mechanisms of third-party mediators (Eisenkopf, 2009), 
which we contribute towards in Chapter Three. There is much work within the 
experimental literature on communication and the treatments differ in various ways, 
for example; timing, who sends the messages, who observes the messages, what type 
of messages can be sent. Both chapters can provide more insight into this too as, using 
experiments, we look for evidence on the role of communication in a class of games 
with imperfect information. In particular, we look at whether mutual aggression can 
be reduced by bi-lateral communication and whether mutual aggression can be 
increased by third party provocation. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, we show that communication between players 
helps to avoid an adverse equilibrium by creating credible information about the 
players’ types. This research helps us to understand the effectiveness of an ‘arms 
control treaty’ because in the absence of a ‘World Court’, any agreement would be 
pure cheap-talk. If all types send the same message, talk is not informative and cannot 
prevent an arms race spiral. However, we show that information can actually be 
generated, which could be used to reduce the likelihood of an arm’s race. It is an 
experiment based on Baliga and Sjostrom (2004) and the design consists of a one-shot 
stag hunt game with four treatment conditions: Treatment 1 serves as a baseline, 
Treatment 2 gives the pure ‘Multiplier Condition’ effect, Treatment 3 gives the pure 
communication effect and Treatment 4 shows the full interaction. We have two 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is that when the condition holds, we expect the frequency of 
the aggressive strategy to increase. Hypothesis 2 is that when the condition holds, we 
expect communication to reduce the frequency of the aggressive strategy. 
 
In the third chapter, we investigate how a third party can manipulate conflict and 
attain an adverse equilibrium by acting as a provocateur. Their talk would not be 
informative if they always sent an aggressive message but by exploiting the behaviour 
of the dominant strategy types, they make a recommendation that would cause just 
one player to play aggressively, maximizing the Provocateur’s payoffs. The study of 
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provocation contributes to tackling extremism. An improved understanding of 
extremist behaviour will help understanding how to approach extremists in situations 
such as after terrorist attacks, during negotiations and before elections. This 
experiment is based on Baliga and Sjostrom (2012) and the design consisted of a one-
shot stag hunt game with two treatment conditions: Treatment 1 serves as a baseline 
and Treatment 2 gives the pure recommendation effect. Again, we had two 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is that we expect a recommendation to increase the 
frequency of the aggressive strategy. Hypothesis 2 is that we expect a 
recommendation to increase the frequency of the aggressive strategy played by the 
“weak moderate” type, Type C.  
 
This thesis has three key findings. Firstly, without communication, players play 
mutually aggressive strategies; both when that is the unique equilibrium and also 
when there are other equilibria. Secondly, costless bi-lateral communication reduces 
play of mutually aggressive strategies. Lastly, in a Strategic Complements game, 
provocation by a third party does not significantly affect the probability of playing 
aggressive strategies which led us to conduct a second set of experiments with 
modified payoffs. There could be several reasons to explain this finding. Players may 
be maximizing the sum of their payoffs (Englemann and Strobel, 2004), inequity 
averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or having (pro-)social preferences (Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1986). The experiment suggests that provocation may not always 
be successful; if the gains from not engaging in conflict are sufficient, the peaceful 
strategy may be stable enough to withstand provocation. 
 
These findings support experiments of a similar nature, such as Charness (2000) who 
shows that without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency are unsuccessful, and 
Clark et al. (2001) who show how agreements to play a Nash equilibrium are fragile 
when players have a strict preference over their opponent’s strategy choice and that 
informative communication does not always lead to the Pareto-dominant outcome. 
We elaborate on the external validation of this thesis within the Conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review 
 
1.1 Theoretical and Empirical Research 
 
1.1.1 Determinants of Conflict 
 
The causes of conflict are as varied as its nature. Its roots are multifaceted and have 
important historical contexts. Historians have identified many factors as potential 
instigators but they believe it is often a combination that can trigger conflict (Carecon, 
2011). These factors include; colonial legacy, militaristic cultures, ethnicity, religion, 
unequal development, inequality, poverty, bad leadership and polity frailties. 
 
The Marxian paradigm states that through an economic class struggle, economic 
inequality is the root cause of conflict (see e.g. Rummel, 1977). This, however, lacks 
robust empirical support and is unlikely to be the primary mechanism behind conflict. 
Inequality is managed in a variety of ways by societies, there are different kinds of 
inequality and the transmission mechanisms that enable a “peaceable” inequality to 
turn into a violent conflict are important factors to be considered (Cramer, 2003). 
Along with insufficient data, the heterogeneity of transmission mechanisms have 
made it even more difficult to conduct convincing empirical work, particularly inter-
country comparison. One of many examples is an empirical study by Muller and 
Seligson (1987) who compare countries within the Central American region to refute 
the “land maldistribution hypothesis” and subsequently contradict the findings of 
Midlarsky and Roberts (1985). Midlarsky and Roberts’ paper supported the 
hypothesis that in El Salvador and Nicaragua conflicts may be caused by rising land 
and economic inequality that is led by population increases and failed agricultural 
policies. Muller and Seligson, however, found Costa Rica and Panama were 
characterized by similar preconditions during the same period as a study on El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, but remained peaceful. 
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Blattman and Miguel (2010) is another example of a study that weakened the 
evidence for the role of income inequality as a sole primary causal factor. They look 
at the contest model, a seminal theory within conflict literature, where two opponents 
(a rebel group and a government) allocate their resources to either production or 
appropriation. The most robust prediction of contest models, with broad empirical 
support, is that the odds of winning increase with the relative effectiveness of that 
player’s fighting technology. However, when developing the model from unitary 
actors to many citizens, problems arise with individual participation; soldiering rises 
only as the opportunity cost of fighting falls and, therefore, households require 
motivation to coordinate. In their paper, they discuss this issue with ‘wealth effects’; a 
low-income population fights because appropriation is more valuable than production, 
and a rich-income population desire conflict because there is more for them to fight 
for. These opposing effects can cancel out in some models (Fearon, 2007) if state 
revenues are drawn entirely from income taxation and income may, thus, have no net 
effect in conflict unless there are non-linearities in the form of the utility function or 
revenue collection function. 
 
Many economic analyses of conflict model conflict as a contest. The contest is a game 
in which players spend resources on arming to increase their probability of winning a 
conflict if one was to occur, otherwise improving their bargaining position or using 
the arms as a deterrent (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2012). The key ingredient to these 
models are the “technologies on conflict” that show how the likelihood of winning 
varies with different levels of arming. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) discuss the 
different functional forms that have been used and review their axiomatic foundations 
or stochastic derivations. Appropriative conflicts occur between groups but also 
within groups. Munster (2007) studies simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts, 
where individuals in groups can utilize their resources for production, for 
appropriation in a contest between groups and for appropriation in a contest within 
their own group. Contractual incompleteness is an exogenous parameter and this leads 
to the absence of well-defined and enforced property rights, thereby enabling a trade-
off between production and appropriation. The technology of conflict is also 
parameterized. The model shows a ‘group cohesion effect’ where if the contest 
between the groups becomes more decisive, the individuals spend fewer resources on 
intra-group conflict. There is a ‘reversed group cohesion effect’ if the contest within 
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the individuals becomes less decisive, and they spend more resources on the inter-
group contest. Munster gives conditions for when the increase in the number of 
groups leads to more productive and less appropriative activities. He also shows that 
there is an optimal size of the entire organization, which is determined by a trade off 
between increasing costs of appropriation and increasing returns to scale in 
production. 
 
Following the skepticism with income as an important causal factor, new theories of 
economic motives emerged, trying to explain the instigation of conflict. Some 
discussed how it could be due to having a capital-intensive economy (Dal Bo and Dal 
Bo, 2004), others focused on the condition of a country’s terms of trade shifting 
(Besley and Persson, 2008) or how easily their wealth could be expropriated (Bellows 
and Miguel, 2008). 
 
Dal Bo and Dal Bo’s paper (2004) followed from the theories of mitigating ‘wealth 
effects’ and looked at positive shocks on capital-intensive and labour-intensive 
sectors. Their model states that if appropriation is more labour intensive than 
production, then shocks to labour-intensive industries will reduce conflict whereas 
shocks to the capital-intensive industries will increase it. With a similar framework, 
Besley and Persson (2008) model terms of trade volatility, investigating how the 
impacts of an increase in import prices or an increase in export prices, cause a higher 
risk of conflict. They found this occurred by import prices suppressing the real wage 
and export prices boosting the size of the government revenue pie. The expropriation 
of wealth is studied by Bellows and Miguel (2008) by linking it with geographic 
patterns. The theory is supported by their empirical findings that significantly more 
armed clashes occurred in areas with greater diamond wealth. They studied the civil 
war in Sierra Leone from 1991-2002 using nationally representative household data 
on conflict experiences, postwar economic outcomes, local politics and collective 
action, to understand local collective action after a group had experienced violence. 
They state that not only did armed groups compete for control over the diamond 
mines but, as large-scale diamond smuggling was made easier by chaos, there was 
less incentive for groups to not prolong the conflict. 
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These explanations were all backed by economic motives; however, some researchers 
argued that conflict could only achieve expression with non-economic markers such 
as national origins, ethnicity and religion (Esteban and Ray, 2008). Ray and Esteban 
study ethnic divisions and discuss how to distinguish between the concepts of 
fractionalization and polarization when researching the causes of conflict. 
Fractionalization is widely indexed by the degree to which a society is split into 
distinct groups, however, polarization has been conceptualized by a variety of 
specifications – some cruder than others. Collier (2001) uses perhaps the crudest, 
dominance, to describe polarization. Societies are considered ‘dominated’ if the 
largest group contains between 45% and 90% of the population. Esteban and Ray 
(1994) use ‘antagonisms’ which are the result of an inter-play between the group-size 
of a group that identify with each other (they have similar characteristics/attributes) 
and the inter-group distance (their sense of alienation with respect to the other 
groups). Unless there are just two groups within a society, the contrast is large; 
fractionalization is maximal when each individual is different, whereas, polarization 
is maximal when there are two only groups of individuals (Ray and Esteban, 2008). 
 
Literature on ethnic divisions, such as Esteban and Ray (2008), still relied on 
economic assumptions, some still vindicating income as an important factor. They 
showed how poverty could potentially inhibit a successful revolution while wealth 
may allow for the resources for engagement in successful conflict but the marginal 
gains for the wealthy are low. However, within an ethnic group, income differences 
may allow for specialisation with the rich providing the money and the poor their 
labour for conflict across ethnic groups. 
 
Mitra and Ray (2014) study intergroup conflict led by economic changes within the 
groups and apply their model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Empirically, 
their main result is that increases in Muslim well-being (measured by per capita 
expenditures) cause a large and significant increase in future religious conflict, 
however, an increase in Hindu well-being has a negative or insignificant effect. They 
use a three-period Indian panel with region and time effects, and find their result is 
robust in many dimensions. They explain that this difference between the groups is 
possibly due to the origins of the violence in post-Independence India. 
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The multitude of unresolved topics within conflict is still large, with leading theories 
still failing to have been rigorously tested empirically (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). 
At the start of this section, I stated that historians believe that wars are often sparked 
by a combination of factors. A factor, which holds a persuasive argument to the extent 
that it is often included within formal models that have been empirically tested, is 
fear. 
 
1.1.2 Conflict and Fear 
 
The 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Robert 
Aumann and Thomas Schelling for “having enhanced our understanding of conflict 
and cooperation through game-theory analysis”. One of Schelling’s major pieces of 
work was ‘The Strategy of Conflict’ (1960), in which he discussed a ‘fear spiral’ now 
termed “Schelling’s dilemma”. When players are unsure of whether their opponents 
are aggressive or peaceful, having actions which are strategic complements leads to 
mutual fear and aggression. The origin of these beliefs could be irrational but when 
types are private information, they can spread through rational contagion. Schelling’s 
book gives an illustration of how uncertainty may lead to an unwanted attack by using 
the case of a homeowner confronting a burglar, both of whom are armed. The players 
may have no desire to kill yet a surprise attack would be the best response when they 
believe the other will attack. 
 
Within pure coordination games, he introduces the concept of a “focal point”, which 
is a solution that people will tend to use in the absence of communication. They may 
use such points because they seem natural or special to the player and Schelling 
explains how they are highly useful in negotiations, in particular, when players cannot 
completely trust their opponent’s words. Mehta et al. (1994) support Schelling’s 
findings in the United Kingdom and the insight has been traced as far back as Hume 
in 1739. Many papers have investigated the concept since, for example, Sugden 
(1995) who gives a theoretical framework that explores the implications of collective 
rationality for a range of games, by distinguishing between the strategic structure of a 
game and the way the players describe the games to themselves. 
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Schelling’s thoughts were formulated into a model by Jervis (1976). He explained that 
the predominant underlying problem of the ‘fear spiral’ was neither human 
psychology nor human nature, but the fact we are living in a Hobbesian Jungle. 
Without a sovereign, each country is only protected by its own strength and, 
therefore, decision-makers worry about the most implausible threats. Even if leaders 
believe that others are not currently acting aggressive, there is no guarantee that they 
will not develop bellicosity later on. Of course, so-called paranoia may turn out to 
have a factual basis. For years, historians believed Frederick the Great of Prussia was 
paranoiac because he insisted the Seven Years’ War was preceded by a foreign 
conspiracy against his state. After accessing secret archives, it turned out that this was 
true. 
 
Jervis (1978) adds that the lack of a sovereign not only permits war but it inhibits a 
state’s ability to achieve common interest goals when they are satisfied with the status 
quo. This is because the policies of cooperation that bring mutual awards, if 
conducted, could bring disaster should one side renege. Therefore, they are all worse 
off than they could be in the absence of sovereignty. This is also echoed in the 
literature on property rights (see Besley and Ghatak, 2010). 
 
This situation of bilateral threat has been examined by many authors since (Janis and 
Mann, 1977; King et al., 2001; Axelrod, 2006). Janis and Mann (1977) build a 
“conflict model” on the actual decision making process, which can also be applied to 
study the decision to engage in a conflict, itself. They give an order of stages that an 
individual goes through, from identifying problems to implementing the decision, and 
state that the stress associated with the process affects the individual’s behaviour; 
evaluating risks causes a person stress which in turn causes them to make more 
inappropriate evaluations. However, an absence of stress could lead to a less 
productive search for information and also lead to unvigilant evaluations. Axelrod 
(2006) gives a more general discussion, using the round-robin computer tournaments 
with a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to understand the evolution of cooperation. 
He uses this to show the potential extensions towards games with varying degrees of 
responses, with three or more players or with uncertainty of players’ objectives like 
the aforementioned studies. 
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The repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is particularly interesting due to its application 
as an example of a concept called Folk theorem. The theorem suggests that anything 
is possible if it is feasible and individually rational (Friedman, 1971). Folk theorems 
can be compared in several aspects, such as whether the game is repeated finitely 
(Benoit and Krishna, 1985) or infinitely (Friedman, 1971), whether the equilibrium 
type is Nash (Aumann and Shapley, 1994) or Subgame-perfect (Rubinstein, 1979), or 
whether the utility of a player is an arithmetic mean (Benoit and Krishna, 1985) or 
discounted sum (Fudenberg and Maskin,1986). In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
game, the only Nash equilibrium is that both players defect. In an infinitely repeated 
version of the prisoner’s dilemma game, the Folk theorem states that sufficiently 
patient players mean there is a Nash equilibrium where both players cooperate on the 
equilibrium path.  
 
Kydd (1997) focuses on how military preparations show a desire for aggression, even 
when they are merely defensive. The action-reaction cycle may occur even without a 
factual basis; when a state assumes the opposition’s escalation is a sign of aggression 
even though they, themselves, are only escalating out of a desire for security. 
Although Jervis explains this is due to psychological bias, Kydd’s paper proposes 
conditions under which such escalation occurs as well as when ‘security seekers’ may 
refrain from escalating. In particular, using a model of incomplete information he 
shows that states that have a high cost of an arms race may rationally show their 
peaceful intent by deliberately not building weapons to signal their peaceful intent. 
 
The key to reducing fear may be addressing the past actions of the players. It has been 
suggested that conflict is developed from the entities’ past actions (Rahim, 2010). 
Rahim discusses the definition of conflict and poses the question of whether it is a 
process or a behaviour, before concluding conflict is an interactive process between 
social entities, which is manifested by incompatibility, disagreement or dissonance. 
He looks at conflict management within organizations, drawing from when the United 
States came under more intense competition from abroad. He investigates intra- and 
inter- personal, as well as group models to develop a design for effective management 
at different levels in an organization. Parties have recognized opposing interests in 
what they perceive to be a zero-sum situation, they believe the other would act against 
them and this belief is likely to be justified by previous actions taken against them. 
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To understand the interactive process between social entities, I think it is important 
not to discount the impact of politics within the process of conflict development. 
Therefore, I will now discuss the relationship between conflict and political systems 
in more detail. 
 
1.1.3 Conflict and Political Systems 
 
For some time, an influential school of thought was that conflict boomed at the end of 
the Cold War due to the sudden introduction of a post-Cold War international system. 
It was then found that, to truly make sense of what was happening, we needed to 
acknowledge the significance of insurgents; a form of militia who harness assorted 
political agendas. Conditions favouring insurgency also favoured conflict (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2001). From studies such as these, it was understood that politics had a 
significant role in the understanding of war. 
 
The impact of political systems is widely considered to be an important factor. 
Economic theory has looked at the political use of wars linked to economic 
performance, election cycles and war decisions (Hess and Orphanides, 1995). 
Observing US politics, it was found that an incumbent leader suffering from bad 
economic performance would initiate a war in order increase chances of re-election, 
even with information symmetry and voter rationality. This was due to the heads of 
state diverting voters who would have judged them otherwise on their (poor) 
economic performance. This causes them to test their leadership skills in a war. Using 
data on state involvement in international war from 1816 to 1975, de Mesquita and 
Siverson (1995) tested four of seven proposed hypotheses, expecting a change in a 
leader’s term-length after the commencement of a war. They found that although war 
was risky regarding re-election, the risk was mitigated if they had been in power for 
some time, particularly for authoritarians. Thus, in congruence with Hess and 
Orphanides’ study, democratic leaders chose wars more likely to be won. 
 
Downs and Rocke (1994) use the phrase ‘gambling for resurrection’. They perform 
formal analysis of strategies that could prevent overly aggressive and overly passive 
leaders. This enables them to show how statesmen will continue a lost war to avoid 
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removal from office, whether it is rational to or not. Fearon (1994) explains that this is 
because the leader will suffer audience costs, which increases proportionally with 
public confrontation. They use this framework to conduct equilibrium analysis 
showing how these costs allow agents to figure out their opposition’s true 
preferences; whether they wish to settle or wage war. The paper finds a democracy 
will be able to signal their intentions more clearly and credibly but they are also less 
likely to back down. Therefore, democratic countries can reduce the ‘fear spiral’, 
however, once they have committed, they will not stop. Mukand and Majumdar 
(2004) look at how leaders persist with inefficient policies in the latter part of the 
electoral cycle. Bandyopadhyay and Oak (2010) show that under asymmetric 
information the electoral process can itself exacerbate conflict with leaders trying to 
signal competence through adopting Hawkish positions. 
 
While the electoral process and re-election motives can trigger conflict, there is a co-
called ‘democratic peace hypothesis’ prevalent in the literature; a suggestion that 
democracies will rarely fight against each other. Studies on this have been 
summarized by a paper relating regime type and conflict, by Tangeras (2008). He 
finds that democratic electorates can effectively punish leaders for bad decisions, 
making democratic leaders more selective of which wars to participate in. They find 
that, on average, these countries win more of the wars they have instigated 
themselves, and so, democracies must be the most peaceful of dyads. Not only are 
democracies less likely to start war but also they are the most unattractive of targets 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). The leaders’ fear of punishment causes them to 
exert additional levels of effort in winning. This military advantage stemming from 
their institutional constraints is studied via eight empirical regularities that comprise 
democratic peace in a game-theoretic setting. Levy and Razin (2004) also find that 
with informational asymmetries and strategic complements, conflicts between two 
democracies differ from other dyads as they have a higher probability of peaceful 
resolution. 
 
Further game-theoretical studies have shown that the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’ is 
not the only relationship we can identity within political systems. Despite Tangeras 
(2008) finding autocratic dyads the least peaceful of duos, there some evidence to 
refute this, claiming there is a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and 
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peace. When investigating the effects of domestic institutional environments on the 
prospect of cooperation, it was found that not only were democratic dyads more 
cooperative but so were autocratic dyads (Leeds, 1999). They suggest that this is 
because of similar abilities to commit credibly, to adjust to changes in the 
environment and to accept costs when policies fail. Peceny et al. (2002) note that this 
research must work from a more sophisticated notion of authoritarianism. They study 
three forms of autocratic regime – personalist, military and single-party dictatorships 
– and find some types are more peaceful than others, towards each other. Although 
single-party dyads were the only ones to have experienced war, with no personalist 
dyads or military dyads having gone to war since 1945, all were still more peaceful 
than a mix. They agree that the evidence is not as robust as democratic peace (shown 
by Bennett, 2006) and more research is needed on autocratic dyads. 
  
Epstein et al. (2006) argue that partial democracies are the most important and least 
understood, not autocracies. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) concentrate on these 
regimes and state that when institutions fail to mature before mass participation, 
democratizing states are the most war-torn. Much theory has developed on the 
intermediate political system and this bolstered the non-monotonicity argument; 
Baliga et al. (2011) use an empirical analysis of militarized disputes in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries that fit their theoretical model and find limited democracies 
are the most aggressive regime of all. The paper uses Polity data to classify countries 
as full democracies, limited democracies and dictatorships, then uses Correlates of 
War data from 1816 to 2000, to suggest that while full democratization might advance 
peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war. Their explanation for 
this is that in limited democracies and dictatorships, citizens are unable to overthrow a 
Hawkish leader, however, the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power by 
appearing too dovish. 
 
It has been shown that when countries’ motivations to go to war depend on their 
‘political bias’, war may be inevitable. This ‘bias’ is a leader’s risk-to-reward ratio of 
a war, compared to the country’s ratio, and it is the strongest with limited 
democracies. When there is no bias, a war can be avoided but a bias on either side 
could result in the worst outcome (Jackson and Morelli, 2005). 
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Psychologists think that the beliefs that trigger conflict can be identified as five 
predominant domains; superiority, injustice, vulnerability, distrust and helplessness 
(Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003). This strong link between economic theory and 
psychology is what is making experimental economics research more popular 
nowadays allowing for testing of alternate hypotheses in a controlled setting. 
 
1.2 Experimental Research 
  
Since the late 1990s, experimental studies on conflict have become increasingly 
popular. As most primary games used in experimental research are not exclusive to 
one situation, they can often model conflict as well. Every public good game can be 
understood as the predicament faced when mobilizing forces for war. Every 
bargaining model could provide insights towards post-conflict negotiations. Every 
risky choice task can be seen as the decision between a peaceful settlement and the 
risk of launching an attack (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2012). This creates a difficult 
process of separating ‘conflict experiments’ from a completely arbitrary selection of 
general-purpose models, and made selecting our framework a particularly challenging 
task. 
 
The use of a first-strike game has been used in the experimental literature in order to 
model a hostile environment (Abbink and de Haan, 2011). This game is of interest 
because of its deliberate removal of economic gains as a motive to attack, enabling us 
to isolate the effects of fear. In the game, two players accumulate earnings over a 
series of rounds. A player is able to deactivate their opponent in any round, causing 
the opponent to lose all earnings and have their future payoffs reduced, whilst further 
ensuring that the deactivator isn’t deactivated, themselves, in future rounds; 
deactivation is hostile but also defensive. The experiment has four treatments that 
disentangle spite, fear of spite and trust. They find a lack of spite but a significant fear 
of it. They also find mutual trust reduced hostility. In our experiments, we use the stag 
hunt game, which is also referred to as the “trust dilemma”, to model fear spirals. The 
justification for their use in our experiments is provided in Section 2.2. 
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In ‘The Handbook of Experimental Economics’ (1997), Abbink states that there are 
around fifteen major experimental economics topics on conflict and papers within 
these have been identified by those mentioning ‘conflict’ in their titles or abstracts. 
For this section, I will discuss some of these topics by arranging them into the 
following categories; anarchy, coordination problems, prevention and post-conflict 
behaviour. 
 
1.2.1 Anarchy 
 
The theme of the first experimental papers on conflict was anarchy; where there is no 
central state guaranteeing property right and individuals must protect their property by 
force. 
 
Durham et al. (1998) started by investigating the ‘Paradox of Power’ (Hirshleifer, 
1991), hoping to gain some understanding on how even though the richer half of a 
population should have more power and ability to exploit the poor, redistribution 
ultimately makes them the exploited. They found that, on average, their predictions of 
POP were confirmed. The poor failed to allocate all their effort to fighting, as theory 
would predict, but the authors justified this as any error from the corner solution of 
devoting all resources (by the poor) to fighting, would show up as a reduction in 
conflict. POP has also been studied with an asymmetric assignment of roles (Carter 
and Anderton, 2001), using a model by Grossman and Kim (1995). There are two 
players investing in production and arms, with only one player’s production 
vulnerable to seizure. This player can only invest in defence, whilst their opposition 
invests in an attack. The paper also supports theoretical predictions. 
 
Grossman and Kim’s model was modified by a paper, which only allowed players to 
pick either production or predation (Duffy and Kim, 2005). Using large groups 
instead of individual players, this introduced a coordination problem. They also 
introduced a Government agent for their second treatment, who imposes a minimum-
spend on defence and has the incentive to maximise production. This implied that, in 
equilibrium, it will choose just enough defence to deter predation and no predation 
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happens. The data converged to their predictions and it was faster in the second 
treatment, although it was hampered slightly by their low number of observations and 
the presence of some heterogeneity across sessions. 
 
Not all experimental models are based on trying to see if subjects play a static Nash 
equilibrium. Some experiments are in continuous-time and are considered more 
natural; however, the results are much harder to interpret. They try to see how much 
of resources people set aside for offence and defence actions. The less stylized 
environments have user interfaces similar to those of a videogame, creating a huge 
amount of heterogeneity of outcomes. In a study by Smith et al. (2009), the fraction of 
potential earnings actually realised ranged from 14% to 71%, but these studies do 
provide useful insight into the way subjects protect their endowment or try to use 
resources to steal other people’s resources both in environments where co-operation is 
possible and others where it is not. 
 
1.2.2 The Coordination Problem 
 
These studies switch from anarchy to models of dictatorship and the manifestation of 
power. They wish to understand how rulers oppress and exploit, yet still stay in 
power. In order to understand this, researchers have modeled a coordination problem 
to determine the behaviour of the citizens. A sufficient number must physically join 
force for a challenge to be successful and it doesn’t matter how many have the desire 
to, if nobody does anything.  Thus, if everyone believes that others will not take 
action, then no challenge occurs, while if people believe others will join, successful 
challenges occur. Thus, even when everyone dislikes a regime, a revolution is a rare 
event when people have successfully coordinated on their beliefs to take action. This 
can help explain the unpredictability of uprisings, the reason why empirical data is so 
sparse i.e. revolutions are rare events. 
 
Abbink and Pezzini (2005) study this requirement of a simultaneous belief that 
enough people will join the revolution. When and how these beliefs occur is 
unobservable but empirical evidence can show what factors underlie the action. They 
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combine this data with a three-stage experiment of seven agents to investigate the link 
between preferences and actions. There is a governor who makes a decision on three 
policy dimensions and citizens choose whether or not they wish to oppose, after a 
stage of communication. If more than five oppose, the governor is replaced by a 
randomly selected successor. They found that greedy governors were likely to be 
overthrown but this threat was deteriorated by restrictions on communication. 
Therefore, their results suggest that a successful dictator should not take too much but 
should be tough on opposition. 
 
Inequality has also been studied within these experiments, using players who are 
advantaged or disadvantaged at earning an income in a rent-seeking game (Abbink et 
al., 2008). They vary the degree of inequality in three treatments and find that the 
disadvantaged are more likely to riot. They also found a more unexpected result 
indicating that more inequality actually reduced the number of revolutions. By 
allowing the participants to match after each round, they investigated whether this 
was down to fear of a counterattack or to resignation. They found it to be the latter. 
 
Leaders can also undergo coordination problems, when a dictator gathers support 
from group leaders for aid in attacking other groups. This has been termed as ‘Divide 
and Conquer’ and studies have been done on what conditions effect group leaders’ 
decisions to join forces against a dictator (Weingast, 1997). It has also been 
investigated whether these group leaders can stop a dictator from transgressing 
altogether (Cason and Mui, 2007, 2009). These results show that private ex-ante 
communication and a probabilistic stopping rule can effectively reduce transgression. 
 
1.2.3 Conflict Prevention 
 
These experiments try to analyse which environments make conflict more likely or 
more intense, thus providing some insight into preventative measures. 
 
In light of recent history, experimental economists have taken an interest in 
counterterrorism strategies. Colombier et al. (2009) investigate the public good nature 
of these strategies, with agents being able to choose national (e.g. border control 
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efforts) or international (e.g. cooperative military action) measures. Unless there are 
punishment or reward opportunities, countries will decrease their own probability of 
being hit but won’t help others. It is also found that punishments are not as efficient as 
rewards, however, all of this information still seems far from an actually 
implementable counterterrorism plan as a reward system with the huge efficiency 
gains they suggest would be difficult to create outside of an experimental setting. 
Abbink and Brandts (2009) investigate independence struggles of minorities in multi-
ethnic countries, using a rent-seeking game. Their work on separatist struggles finds 
that contribution to the ‘war chest’ is more than four times the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium prediction, suggesting their strategic environment resulted in a strong 
emotional charge. The laboratory environment had limited real-world context, which 
many argue, renders experiments such as these, worthless. McBride and Skarpedas 
(2006) agree, stating that conflicts between countries have a strong dynamic 
component that cannot be modeled by techniques like repetition. 
 
1.2.4 Post-Conflict Behaviour 
 
Experiments can be used as a measurement tool of conflict’s impact on human 
behaviour. 
 
Studying post-war Bosnia, Whitt and Wilson (2007) used fairness norms in a dictator 
game to determine interethnic relationships between Bosnjaks, Serbs and Croats. 
They found that after seven years, these norms have been re-established. However, 
when comparing the results relative to those given within this experiment only, there 
is still substantial discrimination. The inferences are not clear-cut as no one conducted 
an experiment before the war, therefore we do not know if the war is exclusively to 
blame. It may just be the effect of in-group identification. 
 
This sort of technique is still valuable and is becoming increasingly pivotal in the 
evaluation of the policy impact. For example, Coleman and Lopez (2010) evaluate the 
“Peace and Development” programme in Columbia using games that measure 
“insular” and “inclusive” cooperation. 
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1.2.5 Political systems 
 
There is surprisingly very little on the topic of different political systems and 
measuring their effects. 
 
These experiments generally have a similar set up and require many participants, such 
as in Bausch (2013), where most sessions included 21 subjects. This paper, like many 
others, only considered a democracy and a dictatorship- it would be interesting to 
include treatments with a limited democracy as well. A coin was flipped to determine 
which regime the group existed under and a leader was randomly assigned as soon as 
the game began. They investigated the role of communication and proved that 
democracies allow agents to organise more efficiently. They also showed that, on 
average, democratic citizens were better off but their leaders would benefit from 
becoming autocratic. However, most experiments within this area of political systems 
do not vary in how they model and implement regimes (see Duffy and Kim, 2005).  
 
 Papers in this area discuss the efficiency of regimes but, from what I have found so 
far, they only concentrate on studying intra-group relationships (effects of introducing 
a government agent, communication) and not the consequences of some external 
source of interaction. In Chapter 3, I look at the impact of third party recommendation 
on the escalation of conflict. 
 
1.3 Conflict and Communication: A Short Literature Review on Cheap 
Talk 
 
Cheap talk is a concept within game theory, in which the communication between 
players does not directly affect their payoffs. There is an assortment of literature on 
information asymmetry, discussing the problems that may be caused by an inability to 
coordinate. Like other issues, such as the lack of property rights and the nonexistence 
of democracy, this asymmetry could be eased by communication. 
 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) introduce the theory of cheap talk in their seminal paper. 
They study a situation involving a degree of conflict, where there is some correlation 
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between an agent’s true type and their preference over the receiver’s true beliefs. This 
model has been used as the basis of many research papers, including that of Krishna 
and Morgan (2004) who use more extensive communication with several rounds and 
a number of experts. Aumann and Hart (2003), and Forges (1990), show the effects of 
multiple rounds of costless signaling, in order to expand equilibrium payoffs. The 
model has also been applied to the theory of coalition formation (Ghosh et al., 2011), 
showing how partisan media, via voting mechanisms, can affect political outcomes. 
Additionally, there has been noteworthy work regarding mediated talk, reported by 
Ray and Ganguly (2006) in a survey article. In my experiment of bi-lateral threat 
possibilities I analyse the role of information transmission. An open area of 
experimental research is how such communication possibilities can affect the stag 
hunt game of incomplete information. We investigate this when there is an arms race 
equilibrium without communication in Chapter 2. 
 
In experimental economics, communication treatments differ not only in timing but 
also in who observes the messages. The role of private information is currently a 
fundamental issue. Players are likely to possess asymmetric information on key 
parameters, in order to gain a competitive advantage against their opponent. Levy 
(2004) and Ottaviani and Sorenson (2006) have studied reputation and how when 
agents are concerned about their image, it can affect the reliability of their advice. 
These studies, along with Ray and Ganguly’s (2006) survey paper, open up the 
opportunity to consider the introduction of a mediator in my experiments. It is 
interesting to deliberate on what may happen if a player with a conflict of interest 
enters our regimes. A modern day example of this player could be the media, who 
will produce partially informative messages that are actually very strong influentially 
but may have a bias. Chapter 3 explores this in a stag hunt game of incomplete 
information. 
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Chapter 2 
Conflict and communication: can cheap-talk reduce 
aggressive behaviour? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
We experimentally analyse the effect of non-binding communication to see if non-
binding pre play communication can reduce the play of aggressive strategies in a 
scenario akin to an arms race. This sheds some light on the effectiveness of an “arms 
control treaty”. As there is no “World Court”, any agreement would be pure cheap-
talk. Aggressive play occurs because of the fear that the opponent will play 
aggressively and we look at whether cheap-talk can reduce that. In order to 
investigate the role of communication, we first show how an arms race type scenario 
can be triggered within an experimental laboratory. We do this using an adaptation of 
a model by Baliga and Sjostrom (2004), in which they show how even a small chance 
that the opponent may be building weapons dramatically increases the chances of 
everyone building, a so-called “arms race spiral”. 
 
It is not obvious that cheap-talk would be successful in this kind of situation because 
if all types send the same message, talk is not informative and cannot prevent an 
“arms race spiral”. However, Baliga and Sjostrom (BS, 2004) show that talk is indeed 
informative. This occurs because while all types want to reduce the probability that 
their opponent arms, all but the players who are dominant types (i.e. who always arm) 
also prefer to know the type of their opponent. Thus, they have incentives to send 
different messages. This creates a scenario (discussed in more details in Section 2.3.3) 
where all but the dominant types do not play aggressive strategies. The 
communication between players helps by creating credible information about the 
players’ types. 
 
The experimental design, based on BS, 2004, consists of a stag hunt game with 
incomplete information. In the Stag Hunt game, each player has to choose amongst 
two strategies: Defect is a safer, risk dominant strategy that yields at least c. The 
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strategy Cooperate might yield the higher payoff of d – if the opponent chooses 
Cooperate as well – but it is risky since it yields only b<c if the opponent chooses to 
Defect. It is easily seen that there are two Nash equilibria, (Cooperate, Cooperate) 
and (Defect, Defect). Hence, when playing this game, players face a coordination 
problem. The dilemma is whether, in view of the strategic uncertainty, one should 
rather play according to the safer equilibrium. Figure 1.1 shows a generic stag hunt 
game.  
 
Defect Cooperate 
 
Defect 
 
 
a , a 
 
c , b 
 
Cooperate 
 
 
b , c 
 
d , d 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Game g(x) (d > c ≥ a > b) 
 
Many game theorists, including Schelling (1960), would argue that the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium (Cooperate, Cooperate) is the natural focal point in the game. 
This outcome has the largest payoff with each player better off than if they chose to 
Defect. Schelling’s principle of tacit bargaining proposes that since the players know 
that if they could communicate they would talk each other into (Cooperate, 
Cooperate), they will also be able to reach this conclusion without actually 
communicating. However, these arguments in favour of (Cooperate, Cooperate), 
which postulate collective rationality, are not wholly convincing in reality. It is 
possible to argue that this payoff-dominant strategy isn’t even always the intuitively 
most appealing solution.  
 
In BS, 2004, they give the example of two states having to decide whether or not to 
invest in a new weapons system (called the ‘Build’ strategy). Each state knows the 
best possible outcome is for neither side to invest in new weapons, but the worst 
possible situation is to be unarmed when the other side is armed. Therefore, no state 
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wants an arms race, but each state will acquire new weapons (‘Build’) if it believes 
the other state will acquire them. With these preferences as common knowledge, there 
exist two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an “arms race equilibrium” in which both 
states acquire new weapons (Build, Build) and a “détente equilibrium” in which 
neither state acquires new weapons (Not Build, Not Build). Rational players should be 
able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant détente equilibrium, perhaps using 
communication (O’Neill, 1999). However, Baliga and Sjostrom shows that if each 
state assigns some very small probability to the event that the opponent is a truly 
aggressive type for whom acquiring weapons is a dominant strategy, then under some 
conditions, this gives a multiplier effect; an escalating cycle of pessimistic 
expectations towards mutual armaments leading to everyone playing the ‘Build’ 
strategy, leading to an arms race. 
 
Baliga and Sjostrom suggest the role of communication to see if this can lead to an 
equilibrium where all but dominant types play the ‘Not Build’ strategy. They consider 
an extension in which the players are allowed to send a costless message in the first 
stage. Thus, before making the decision to ‘Build’ or not, each state can send a 
Hawkish (aggressive) message or a Dovish (conciliatory) message to the opponent. 
These messages are pure cheap-talk and the players are free to arm themselves 
(‘Build’) regardless of what messages were sent. Since all types are better off if their 
opponent does not arm, one may believe that all types would send a Dovish message 
as it is most likely to persuade the opponent not to arm; thus, rendering cheap-talk 
uninformative, and not reducing the likelihood of an arms race whatsoever. However, 
cheap-talk can be informative. For the types who are not truly aggressive, it is not 
only the probability that the opponent defects that matters, but it is also important to 
be able to coordinate with their opponent. They show that if the dominant types are 
sufficiently rare then, with cheap-talk, there exists an equilibrium where the 
probability of an arms race is close to zero. Thus, communication can expand the set 
of equilibria and reduce the probability of an arms race. 
 
Our experiments are designed to analyse two questions in the BS, 2004 environment. 
First, we consider whether there are differences in play of the aggressive strategy 
(‘Build’) when there is a unique equilibrium (this holds when a so called ‘Multiplier 
Condition’ is present that leads to a spiral in the presence of a dominant type) vs. 
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when there are other equilibria present (i.e. the ‘Multiplier Condition’ does not hold). 
Next, we consider the introduction of nonbinding, pre-play communication to see if 
there is a reduction in play of the aggressive strategy. We now describe the 
experiment in more detail. 
 
The experiment has a 2x2 between-subject design. Overall, the design consists of a 
one-shot stag hunt game with four treatment conditions. 
 
Table 2.1: Four treatments of the experiment 
 
Multiplier 
Condition Holds 
Cheap-Talk 
Enabled 
Treatment 1   
Treatment 2 x  
Treatment 3  x 
Treatment 4 x x 
 
Treatment 1 serves as a baseline, Treatment 2 gives the pure ‘Multiplier Condition’ 
effect, Treatment 3 gives the pure communication effect and Treatment 4 shows the 
full interaction i.e. when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ is present and there is 
communication. 
 
Subjects were only allowed to participate in one treatment and played with an 
anonymous opponent. The sessions did not last more than forty minutes each. There 
were a total of 160 participants, as each treatment included two sessions with 20 
participants in each. Treating each game (pair of participants) as an independent 
observation, this gave 10 independent observations per session and a total of 20 
independent observations per treatment. In Treatments 3 and 4, costless free-form 
messages were exchanged simultaneously before the players submitted their 
decisions. Players submitted their decisions simultaneously and then their beliefs 
about their opponent’s behaviour were elicited. The payoff matrices determined their 
payoffs, the outcomes were disclosed at the end of the experiment and all participants 
were paid privately. 
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BS (2004) that if the ‘Multiplier Condition’ is satisfied, there is a unique Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium where all types choose to acquire weapons. Thus, our first 
hypothesis is that when the condition did not hold in Treatment 1, we expected at 
least some types to play the ‘Not Build’ strategy while when the ‘Multiplier 
Condition’ held in Treatment 2, we expected all types to choose ‘Build’. 
 
For our second hypothesis, we considered the choice of individuals in the first and last 
treatments. BS, 2004 showed that if the probability that the player is a dominant type 
is very small, then, using cheap-talk, there is an equilibrium where the probability of 
an arms race is close to zero. We compared both the baseline of Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 2 where the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds with Treatment 4, which showed 
the full interaction of the ‘Multiplier Condition’ and cheap-talk. We predicted that in 
the latter treatment, all types (except the dominant Hawks) would be more likely to 
play the ‘Not Build’ strategy. 
 
We present our analysis in two parts. First, we give a descriptive analysis; checking 
whether there are differences in the frequency of the ‘Build’ strategy between 
treatments and formally examining whether or not there are significant differences in 
the observed frequencies among treatments by using a non-parametric Wilcoxon 
ranksum test. Then, as the non-parametric statistical test does not control for other 
characteristics that may affect an individual’s decision, we also use a multivariate 
regression to address our hypotheses. We use a probit model as the dependent 
variable is binary.  
 
We found there is no significant difference in the frequency of playing ‘Build’ 
between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2; participants do not choose ‘Build’ more when 
the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds. However, there is a significant difference in the 
frequency of ‘Build’ between Treatments 1 and 2 and Treatment 4; participants 
choose ‘Build’ more when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds and when cheap-talk is 
enabled. We briefly investigate the individual effect of cheap-talk using data from 
Treatment 3, to check whether the effect is most likely from the full interaction, 
which includes the ‘Multiplier Condition’, or possibly from the communication alone. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature 
review; discussing papers with similar information structures, the role of cheap-talk in 
this area, broader models of arms races and relevant experimental literature. Section 
2.3 explains the model and Section 2.4 describes the experimental design. In Section 
2.5, we give our hypotheses. In Section 2.6, we give our results and discuss them. In 
Section 2.7, we conclude. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
Schelling (1960) first introduced the multiplier effect discussed by Baliga and 
Sjostrom. His paper explained how a non-zero-sum conflict could exist. It was known 
that conflict could coexist with common interest but Schelling suggests that both are 
aspects of an integral structure and aren’t separable. He wrote that “the best choice for 
either player depends on what he expects the other to do, knowing that the other is 
similarly guided, so that each is aware that each must try to guess what the second 
guesses the first will guess the second to guess and so on, in the familiar spiral of 
reciprocal expectations”. 
 
He sets up the problem and illustrates the multiplier effect, using an example of 
mutual distrust. He describes the situation of finding yourself face-to-face with a 
burglar, where you’re both armed and where there is the danger of an outcome which 
neither of you desires. Whether or not either of you want him to leave peacefully, he 
may think that you want to shoot him. Even worse, he may believe you think that he 
wants to shoot you. Or he may think you think he thinks you think… and so on. If the 
gains from shooting first are less than the gains from not attacking at all, there is no 
basis of attack for either player and there is little justification of self-defence. 
However, introducing the smallest temptation may proliferate through a process of 
interacting expectations. 
 
This payoff matrix can be exemplified by a number of scenarios. It is equivalent to 
any problem of two partners who lack confidence in each other, for example, if some 
members of a gang are being closed in on by the police, the rest might be tempted to 
kill them, further tempting those being pursued to become snitches. Schelling builds 
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an explicit model in which two rational players are victims of the logic that governs 
their expectations of each other. He analyzes whether a multiplier effect can be 
generated and then how this phenomenon can arise through a rational choice of 
strategies and the calculation of probabilities. 
 
Baliga and Sjostrom’s paper differs from previous literature both in terms of the 
incomplete information structure and the cheap-talk extension. We now discuss this in 
detail, stating other game-theoretical papers that have developed Schelling’s 
information structure. We also look at papers that have studied equilibrium selection 
in the Stag Hunt game plus experimental papers based on these developments. 
 
A paper by Rubenstein (1989) applies Schelling’s argument and discusses “almost 
common knowledge”, where there are only a finite (but large) propositions of the type 
“I know that you know that I know… that the game is G.” He analyses this using a 
game with incomplete information and Halpern’s (1986) example of the “coordinated 
attack problem”. In this problem, there are two divisions that will win a battle if they 
both attack simultaneously, whereas they will be defeated if only one attacks. The 
commanding general of the first division wants to coordinate and he knows neither 
will attack unless he is sure the other will attack with him. The divisions can only 
communicate via a messenger but it is possible he may get lost or captured, and if he 
does make it to the camp, the general will now require a reply in order for him to 
know his message was received. The returning messenger would also risk not getting 
across and the second general will also require a response to know his confirmation 
had been received. 
 
Rubenstein investigates how long it would take them to coordinate an attack, using 
his own game called “Coordination Through Electronic Mail”. Two players want to 
coordinate on the state of nature (either a or b) and only the first is told the true state. 
The players are in two different locations and can only communicate by signals. The 
sending of messages is not a strategic decision by the players, it is automatically 
carried out by the computers; a message is only sent if the state of nature is b but due 
to “technical difficulties”, there’s a small probability that the message doesn’t arrive.  
The computers send a confirmation automatically if any message is received, 
including the confirmation of the initial message, and the confirmation of the 
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confirmation, and so on. The players are only able to choose a or b after the 
communication phase has ended and since there are only a finite number of messages 
transferred, the players never have common knowledge of the state of nature. They 
were given the number of messages their machine had sent and, sometimes facing 
higher order statements, they made their decisions. With the results from this game, 
he convinces us that in the “coordination attack problem”, even if there is no common 
knowledge of the attack at the end of the information transmission, there is a 
possibility with a positive probability that they will both attack at dawn, especially if 
the probability of messenger failure is very small.  
 
Jervis (1978) highlights that there is not much distinction between offensive and 
defensive weapons because even if a country arms for defensive purposes, they will 
make other countries feel less secure. He calls this the “security dilemma”, where the 
suspicion that a state may arm, for whatever purpose, makes others more likely to arm 
in self-defence, creating a multiplier effect (or an “arms race spiral”) that makes 
everyone worse off. He based this discussion on a stag hunt game, where the best 
possible outcome is for nobody to arm, but each player prefers to arm if they think the 
opponent will. If it is common knowledge that the pay-offs are those of a stag hunt 
game, it is not clear why rational players could not refrain from an arms build-up. 
Jervis argued that it, therefore, must be driven by irrationality, although it is possible 
it could just be a coordination failure. 
 
Many papers have studied the Stag Hunt game and equilibrium selection. Carlsson 
and Van Damme (1993) highlight the hazards of taking short cuts in matters of 
equilibrium selection and they implore for a more fundamental approach where 
solutions are derived from individualistic assumptions. The use of an informational 
set-up implying a considerable weakening of the common knowledge assumption was 
shown to generate a model with different equilibrium selection properties. They 
compute and compare the solutions of the equilibrium selection theories by Harsanyi 
and Selton (1988), Guth and Kalkofen (1989), and Guth (1992), for the Stag Hunt 
game. 
 
A common feature of those theories is that the selection of a particular equilibrium 
results from the individual players’ strategic uncertainty. Kydd (1997) also suggested 
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incomplete information about the opponent’s preferences by introducing states that 
want war, and some that want peace, into Jervis’ model. His discrete type space meant 
there was no contagion and he discussed how initial armaments could signal a 
player’s type in a repeated game. Baliga and Sjostrom showed how, with a continuous 
type space, a multiplier effect could be triggered by an arbitrarily small probability 
that a player “wants war”. Although in theoretical models, mixed strategies are 
commonly studied in games of multiple equilibria, we focus exclusively on pure 
strategies. We consider Kyd’s method and use a discrete version of Baliga and 
Sjostrom’s model, where there is still a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. 
 
However, there are still major differences in the papers discussed by Carlsson and 
Van Damme; the Harsanyi/Selton approach selects a specific form of uncertainty, a 
uniform prior in some fixed scheme of expectations formation, whereas in Carlsson 
and Van Damme, the uncertainty results from more fundamental assumptions about 
how the players’ information is generated; they assume players signals/types (and 
payoffs) consist of a common shock plus a noise term. They derive the selection rule 
within a strictly non-cooperative framework by perturbing the game to be solved and 
inserting it in a game of incomplete information, deeming Harsanyi and Selton’s 
approach to have a somewhat ad hoc character. 
 
In this 1993 paper, Carlsson and Van Damme showed that for two-player 2x2 games, 
Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion could be justified with slight payoff 
uncertainty. In their later paper, they demonstrated that some of their previous 
model’s properties, which only covered 2x2 games, could be generalized to a class of 
n-person symmetric binary choice problems. They showed that introducing slight 
payoff uncertainty allows the equilibrium selection problem to be resolved by a 
process of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, because when the 
noise is small, the players’ types are very highly correlated and there is a unique 
equilibrium. However, although they found that if there are two players, all solutions 
from the equilibrium selection theories coincided, if the number of players exceeds 
two, then these approaches no longer yielded the same solutions. 
 
Cabrales et al. (2007) ran an experiment based on Carlsson and Van Dammes’ theory 
of global games, studying what happens when they introduce uncertainty, similar to 
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how we have implemented uncertainty within our experimental design. However, the 
uncertainty in their game was incorporated by sending each subject a noisy signal 
about the true payoffs. They find the Carlsson/Van Damme results do not hold under 
all circumstances. The game had a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies and thus had a unique Nash equilibrium. 
On average, this equilibrium outcome coincided with the risk-dominant equilibrium 
outcome of the underlying coordination game. In the baseline game, they found 
behaviour converged to theoretical prediction after 50 periods. The data suggested 
that this could be explained by learning. Other research in this area is by Heinemann 
et al. (2004) who also find a small but significant difference between complete and 
incomplete games and Cornand (2006) who extends their paper by introducing a 
public signal in addition to the private signal. 
 
Like these papers, subjects participating in experiments frequently do not succeed in 
coordinating on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Van Huyck et al. (1990) also use 
experiments to approach the equilibrium selection problem and study a class of tacit 
pure coordination games with multiple equilibria, which are strictly Pareto ranked. 
They provide further evidence on how human subjects make decisions under strategic 
uncertainty by studying the conflict between efficiency and security. They ran seven 
experiments with a total of 107 students and used incentivized belief elicitation. The 
difference between the experiments were whether the pairings were random or fixed, 
the periods in which subjects made decisions and the number of periods; the game 
could be repeated up to 27 times. The minimum action was the only common 
historical data available to the subjects. They found coordination failure was due to 
strategic uncertainty because some subjects concluded that it was too risky to choose 
the payoff-dominant action and most subjects focused on outcomes in earlier period 
games. Their results showed that the payoff-dominant equilibrium was extremely 
unlikely, even in repeated play. They concluded that only the secure, inefficient 
equilibrium indicates behaviour that subjects were likely to coordinate on, in repeated 
play, when the numbers of players is large. 
 
Straub (1995), Schmidt et al. (2003) and Clark et al. (2001) looked at the risk and 
payoff properties of games in more depth. Straub (1995) suggested that the existence 
of a payoff dominated risk dominant equilibrium was a necessary but not sufficient 
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condition for coordination failure. He presented a trade off between risk dominance 
and payoff dominance, and then linked this to the speed of convergence towards an 
equilibrium. He ran eleven sessions that lasted at least nine periods and he tested 
seven different payoff matrices. In each session, ten subjects repeatedly played the 
same single-period two-person game against a different opponent. Schmidt et al. 
(2003) found that changes in risk dominance did significantly affect subjects, whereas 
changes in payoff dominance did not. In their experiments, observing the history of 
play greatly influenced the participants’ behaviour, whether they were re-matched or 
not. Participants were given complete information about the payoff structure and after 
each round, all were told their opponent’s decision and their own payoffs. They did 
not receive information on the decisions of the other pairs nor were they told the 
number of rounds. The experiment consisted of four different games with four 
sessions conducted per game. Three groups had no previous experience of the game, 
however, one subject group contained subjects randomly selected from those who had 
played in previous sessions. Clark et al. (2001) studied repetition and showed that 
although participants generally failed to attain the efficient equilibrium of a one-shot 
game, they could in the repeated version. They found the participants were using 
actions to signal future intentions in the repeated games. They ran four treatments; a 
Coordination Game in two treatments and a Mechanism Game in two treatments, and 
they conducted two sessions per treatment. For each game, they ran a one-shot 
treatment and a Repetition treatment. In the Repetition treatment, the subjects either 
played a ten-period repeated games or sequences of ten one-shot games. 
 
We can also apply Schelling’s argument to macroeconomic phenomena such as 
currency attacks and liquidity crises. Morris and Shin (2003) state that if spectators 
believe that a currency will come under attack, their actions in anticipation accelerate 
the crisis, while if they believe that a currency is not in danger of imminent attack, 
their inaction spares the currency and vindicates their initial beliefs. They say that the 
actual onset of an attack cannot merely be attributed to the self-fulfilling nature of 
beliefs. Conventional papers explain the process on forces outside of the theoretical 
model, ignoring the role of speculators’ beliefs about other speculators’ behaviour. 
They assume that speculators know exactly what other spectators will do. 
 
Their paper acknowledges that although this isn’t realistic, they may have some idea, 
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and so it takes neither extreme. As there is some uncertainty about equilibrium, the 
spectators’ behaviour depends somewhat on what they believe they will do. Self-
fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when the fundamentals are 
common knowledge, but they demonstrate a unique equilibrium when speculators 
face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals.  
 
Cooper (1999) provides a broad survey of similar macroeconomic coordination game 
literature. In his first chapter, he also uses experimental evidence to convince readers 
of the relevance of coordination games to macroeconomics. He lists the 
aforementioned (e.g. Van Huyck) papers which use experiments to research 
complementarities, isolating the various sources of complementarity and exploring 
their implications, and applies their findings to macroeconomic problems, for 
example, how increased effort by other agents leads the remaining agent to follow suit 
– becoming the basis for multiple equilibria and also giving rise to multiplier effects. 
Using these papers, he explores some of the theories of selection and he relates the 
key points to the multiplicity of Nash equilibria and their Pareto ranking. He states the 
most important of these points is confidence rather than conflict and that overall, the 
evidence points to the fact that Pareto domination does not provide a natural focal 
point; coordination failures can arise. Complementarities have been applied in a 
variety of other contexts too, including development, in which Hoff and Stiglitz 
(2001) and Ray et al. (2007) provide excellent discussions. 
 
A common shock and correlated types may be a good approximation of some 
interactions. However, in many situations the costs and benefits from taking a certain 
action may be specific to a certain player. These authors assume that players’ types 
are correlated in a way that would be unnatural in our context. Baliga and Sjostrom 
obtain a multiplier effect without any correlation of types. For example, in the bank-
run model, liquidity shocks may be uncorrelated. In the arms-race model, the costs 
and benefits from acquiring nuclear weapons depend on many psychological, moral 
and political considerations that may be specific to a certain leader. The cost of 
developing nuclear weapons could also be much lower for a nation if they have access 
to technical expertise and fissile material. Whether a state has such access will depend 
on a variety of idiosyncratic events that may be independent across countries and will 
be hard for an opponent to verify. 
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Harsanyi (1973) studied incomplete information games with independent types. He 
showed that every Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is the limit of 
pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of any sequence of incomplete games that are 
close-by. However, Baliga and Sjostrom find conditions under which only the Pareto-
inefficient “arms race” equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of the 
game with incomplete information. Their results differ from Harsanyi’s because even 
though they assume each player is almost sure that the opponent does not have a 
dominant strategy, there is substantial uncertainty about the actual numerical payoffs 
and therefore no ordinal ranking of the outcomes. Thus, even though the underlying 
complete information games have multiple equilibria with high probability, when 
there is a common shock but little noise or there is no common shock but a large 
amount of noise, there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium; it can be the result of 
either sufficient correlation of types or sufficient uncertainty about independent types. 
 
This intuition has been made very precise by Morris and Shin (2002).  Baliga and 
Sjostrom refer to their paper for a detailed discussion of the relationship between 
common shocks, independent types, noise and multiplicity. Morris and Shin first 
introduce a simple binary action example with random matching. They then discuss 
alternative interpretations, including incomplete information. 
 
Two players are randomly chosen from a population. Each Player i is characterized by 
a payoff parameter xi. They assume that the payoff parameter is normally distributed 
in the population. However, the draws from the population are not independent: two 
players are more likely to be chosen to interact if they have similar payoff parameters. 
Thus, x1 and x2 are jointly normally distributed with a correlation coefficient that 
measures their parameters’ similarities. The player knows the payoff of an action but 
there is strategic uncertainty over the opponent’s action, due to the uncertainty over 
the opponent’s payoff parameter. The player’s private value xi is essentially their type. 
They have a uniqueness condition as when xi is either very high (greater than one) or 
very low (less than zero), Player i has a dominant action, and strategic uncertainty is 
only relevant when xi lies in between zero and one. When the condition is satisfied, 
each player chooses action 1 only if his type is above some threshold. If the 
correlation coefficient were identically equal to zero, there was complete information, 
and if the players’ common type was between 0 and 1, there would be multiple 
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equilibria. Thus, there is a unique equilibrium either if there is sufficient variance of 
players’ private values or if those private values are sufficiently closely correlated. 
 
They also show how strategic multipliers can be interpreted across different 
interaction settings by studying an interaction game with the local heterogeneity, 
giving a useful qualitative distinction between different kinds of strategic multipliers. 
It highlights that the extreme sensitivity in the limit of a global game is closely related 
to the jumps between complete information equilibria that must occur if there is not 
common knowledge. In settings where there is a small amount of local heterogeneity, 
the local sensitivity is largest when heterogeneity is small, and it helps to explain why 
small actions by, say, the Government can have a large effect on outcomes. 
 
We have given an assortment of literature on information asymmetry, and there is 
much more to discuss the problems that may be caused by an inability to coordinate. 
Like other issues, such as the lack of property rights and the nonexistence of 
democracy, this asymmetry could be caused by communication. So far, none of these 
papers consider the role of cheap-talk when Baliga and Sjostrom’s focus is on the 
cheap-talk extension of their model. We will now introduce the concept of cheap-talk, 
discuss literature in this area and give existing experimental findings. 
 
Cheap-talk is a concept within game theory, in which the communication between 
players does not directly affect their payoffs. Crawford and Sobel (1982) introduce 
the theory of cheap-talk in their seminal paper. They study a situation involving a 
degree of conflict, where there is some correlation between an agent’s true type and 
their preference over the receiver’s true beliefs. This model has been used as the basis 
of many research papers, for example, using more extensive communication with 
several rounds and a number of experts (Krishna and Morgan, 2004).  
 
Most articles study the sender-receiver games where the informed party takes no 
further role in the game after sending a report to the receiver. McDaniel (2011) 
investigates the effects of uncertainty, however, this is one-sided, with one player 
having perfect information. They show that the benefit of cheap-talk depends on the 
relationship between payoffs and risks, and cheap-talk only benefits informed players 
when the stag hunt payoffs exhibit low risks. The experiment is 2x2 and consisted of 
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two games; each randomised between prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt (one with 
riskier payoffs than the other). For each game they varied the amount of 
communication allowed. Either players simultaneously made choices at the start of 
each round or the player with perfect information was allowed to send a non-binding 
message to their opponent, and then they simultaneously made their choices. Subjects 
were matched with the same partner for 16 rounds and changed player types every 
four rounds. In contrast, Baliga and Sjostrom’s paper assumes both players have 
private information, send messages and take actions. There is a small set of models 
with a related structure (Baliga and Morris (2002), Matthews and Postlewaite (1989), 
Austen-Smith (1990)). 
 
Duffy et al. (2010) specifically look at costly communication and how messages 
available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world. This is more in 
conjunction with Baliga and Sjostrom’s cheap-talk extension. They find that larger 
communication costs are associated with worse outcomes for both the sender and 
receiver. They find that there is over-communication and that the response time of 
both the sender and receiver are positively related to their payoffs. 
 
Most closely related to our research is Banks and Calvert’s (1992) paper, which uses a 
battle-of-the-sexes game. In their model, there is also two-sided incomplete 
information, and each player has his own favourite outcome but his type (high or low) 
determines the intensity of his preference. Without communication, there are efficient 
asymmetric Bayesian–Nash equilibria where one player always gets his favourite 
outcome, and the only symmetric equilibrium involves an inefficient randomization. 
However, Banks and Calvert show how communication can produce a symmetric 
equilibrium where coordination occurs more frequently. Their favourite action is also 
more likely to be chosen when the intensity of their preference is high. 
 
In the battle-of-the-sexes game, players just want to take the same action, whilst in a 
stag hunt game, players always want their opponent to choose a particular strategy 
(not arm). Thus, the nature of communication is different in the two games. Aumann 
(1990) states that this makes communication particularly difficult, with each player 
wanting their opponent to take the same action whatever action they take themselves. 
He used a variant of the stag hunt game to show that an agreement to play the most 
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efficient outcome actually conveys no information about what the players will do. 
Many experiments had been conducted on coordination in 2x2 games, but few with 
uncertainty similar to his. Since then, much research has been made in this area to 
show that, in simple coordination games, the effectiveness of communication is 
affected by many factors. These include the order of messages and actions, message 
credibility and relative payoff differences between Pareto ranked equilbria. 
 
One of the many papers contesting Aumann was by Farrell and Rabin (1996), who 
said cheap-talk could achieve efficiency. They stated a message could be self-
committing if it created incentives for the signaler to fulfill it and if the other player 
considered the message credible. Charness (2000) tested this and found coordination 
when the sender first chooses a signal and then an action. Without communication, he 
found that efforts to achieve efficiency are unsuccessful. He also found that reversing 
the order, and choosing the action first, led to a change in the players’ behaviour. The 
experiment used 10 periods and subjects were in groups of six. Within their groups, 
the subjects were told that their partners and their roles would be re-matched after 
every round. Non-binding signals were made by writing “I intend to play [A or B]” on 
a piece of paper which were anonymously passed to their opponents. Different payoff 
calibrations were used to investigate the sensitivity to risk-dominance. 
 
Clark et al. (2001) showed inconclusive results testing Aumann’s conjecture. They 
investigated whether the credibility of subjects’ messages is important to achieve 
socially optimal outcomes and looked at the sensitivity of communication to the 
structure of payoffs. They found that agreements to play a Nash equilibrium are 
fragile when players have a strict preference over their opponent’s strategy choice. 
They also used a game where subjects had a positive incentive to represent 
themselves truthfully and found that informative communication does not always lead 
to the Pareto-dominant outcome. Their main experiment had four treatments, two 
games with varying payoffs structures, each played with and without communication. 
They ran treatments without communication for three reasons; it enabled the 
investigation of the robustness of behaviour to payoff variation, they could validate 
their procedures by comparing their results to existing literature, and it provided a 
baseline against which the effects could be judged. They used simultaneous, fixed 
messages and subjects were re-matched after every period for ten rounds. Similar to 
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Charness (2000), signals were made by sending “I intend to play [A or B]” and 
subjects were reminded that they were not required to make the choice that they had 
announced. 
 
The aforementioned article by Banks and Calvert (1992) show how communication 
can produce a symmetric equilibrium and efficiency, if there is a mediator. In 
experimental economics, communication treatments differ not only in timing but also 
in who observes the messages. Players are likely to deliver asymmetric information 
on key parameters, in order to gain a competitive advantage against their opponent. 
Levy (2004) and Ottaviani and Sorenson (2006) have studied reputation and how 
when agents are concerned about their image, it can affect the reliability of their 
advice. These studies, along with Ray and Ganguly (2006), open up the opportunity to 
consider the introduction of a mediator (a “World Court”) in our experiments. In 
Baliga and Sjostrom’s model, they can work out first-best efficiency without a 
mediator when the dominant strategy types are rare. They also state that the issue of 
whether a mediator is useful when the dominant strategy types are not rare is an 
interesting topic for future work. 
 
Schelling’s stated players may attack each other inadvertently because of a false 
alarm. If the underlying problem is an imperfect warning system, then Baliga and 
Sjostrom state that cheap-talk cannot be the solution. They showed that cheap-talk can 
be useful when the underlying problem is incomplete information about the 
opponent’s preferences and one can interpret their model as a model of war 
initiations; each nation must simultaneously decide whether to attack or not. 
 
Their results are also irrelevant if the perceived first-mover advantage is large as then 
the true pay-off matrix is more likely to be a prisoner’s dilemma than a stag hunt 
game; as with the battle-of-the-sexes game, they state that pre-play communication is 
not useful in the former but is in the latter.  
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2.3 Model 
 
2.3.1 Baliga and Sjostrom’s Stag Hunt Game 
 
 
In the Stag Hunt game, there exist two pure strategy Nash equilibria; an “arms-race” 
equilibrium in which both governments acquire new weapons (Build, Build) (the 
equivalent of (Defect, Defect) in game g(x)) and a “détente” equilibrium in which 
neither government acquires any weapons (Not Build, Not Build) (or (Cooperate, 
Cooperate) in g(x)). The Nash equilibrium (Not Build, Not Build) Pareto dominates 
the other.  
 
The game we use is essentially a coordination game augmented with incomplete 
information about players’ independently drawn types, and the true payoff matrix is a 
stag hunt game with a high probability. The payoffs are given as below where ci is the 
cost of building weapons for Player i, with one type having low enough c for ‘Build’ 
to be a dominant strategy. We denote by ci the cost of aggression for player i; if the 
cost of building is lower, then the player is more aggressive. We call d the disutility of 
being less advantaged with an inferior weapon system and ! the gain of being more 
advantaged. 
 
 
Build Not Build 
 
Build 
 
 
−ci 
 
µ−ci 
 
Not Build 
 
 
−d  
 
0 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Payoff matrix of Player i in Baliga and Sjostrom’s (2004) model 
 
	  	  
39	  
2.3.1.1 Parameters 
 
–ci > –d ensures that ‘Build’ is always a best response against ‘Build’. However, ‘Not 
Build’ is a best response against ‘Not Build’ for Player i, if and only if ci ≥ µ. Thus, if 
ci < µ, Player i is an “aggressive” type and ‘Build’ is a strictly dominating strategy for 
them. µ is small so that the probability of being the “aggressive” type, F(µ), is close to 
0.  
These parameters give payoffs that mean that the “aggressive” type, who has the 
highest propensity to arm, will always play ‘Build’ and arm. The “fairly aggressive” 
type has a medium propensity and prefers to take whatever action he thinks his 
opponent is most likely to take. Therefore, he will play ‘Not Build’ if assured facing 
peaceful (“normal”) opponent, otherwise, he will play ‘Build’. “Normal” types have 
the lowest propensity. They will only arm if they are almost sure their opponent will 
and even so, their payoff differential is not very high from playing ‘Build’.  
 
2.3.2 The Multiplier Effect 
 
As mentioned earlier, introducing the uncertainty affects our decision on which one of 
the two Pure Nash equilibria to select. Assigning a small but positive probability on 
the event that the opponent is a truly aggressive type, for whom acquiring weapons is 
a dominant strategy, can trigger an arms race. 
 
The situation is modeled as follows. Each state has a type parameterizing their 
propensity to arm. The state’s true type is its private information, and types are 
independently drawn from a continuous distribution. At one end of the distribution are 
the “aggressive” types; they prefer to arm regardless of the opponent’s actions (a 
fraction ε > 0 of the players). At the other end of the distribution are the “normal” 
types who prefer to arm only if they are virtually sure the opponent will arm. In 
between are the “fairly aggressive” types (a fraction δ > 0 of the players), who prefer 
to arm when the opponent arms with even the smallest probability. The “aggressive” 
types have a dominant strategy to arm; they will certainly arm; but this triggers a 
multiplier effect, as the “fairly aggressive” (“almost dominant strategy types”) must 
arm in equilibrium but then, all types that prefer to arm when the opponent arms with 
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at least probability δ + ε must arm, etc. The spiral of pessimistic expectations and fear 
causes more and more types to arm. Therefore, even when each state thinks it is 
extremely unlikely that the opponent is the dominant strategy type, the unique 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium appears to involve an arms race with probability one.  
 
BS, 2004 shows that when a so-called ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, it means that 
there can be no symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where ‘Not Build’ is chosen 
with positive probability. Therefore it guarantees that each type will strictly prefer to 
choose ‘Build’ whenever he thinks all types with a lower cost than him will choose 
‘Build’, so the contagion to play ‘Build’ will infect the whole population. 
 
Formally, the distribution satisfies the ‘Multiplier Condition’ if F(c)d ≥ c for all c. 
This means for each type: given all types with lower costs play aggressively, they 
prefer to play aggressively too, because the expected disutility of not being aggressive 
when all those with lower costs are aggressive (F(c)d)), is bigger than the cost of their 
aggression (c). We choose parameters in Treatments 2 and 4 such that for each type, if 
they know that types with costs lower than them play the aggressive strategy, they 
would also play the aggressive strategy. 
 
2.3.3 Cheap-Talk  
 
Baliga and Sjostrom show there exists an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension 
where the probability of an arms race is close to zero. Thus, communication can 
expand the set of equilibria. 
  
They consider an extension where before making the decision to arm, each state sends 
a Hawkish (aggressive) message or a Dovish (conciliatory) message to the opponent. 
These messages are pure cheap-talk and a state is free to arm itself regardless of what 
messages were sent. The cheap-talk can be informative as although all types want to 
reduce the probability that the opponent arms, some players (the non-aggressive 
types) also want to reduce the uncertainty of their opponent’s action to avoid a 
coordination failure. As the different types will trade off these two objectives at 
different rates, it may be possible to induce different types to send different messages, 
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where the “fairly aggressive” type put the highest value on resolving the uncertainty 
about the opponent’s action, whereas the “aggressive” and “normal” types are more 
interested in reducing the probability of their opponent arming. 
 
Essentially, the separation of the “aggressive” and “fairly aggressive” types prevents 
the multiplier effect, so the model requires these two types to send different messages. 
Thus, BS, 2004 construct a separating equilibrium. A Dovish message minimizes the 
probability the opponent arms and a Hawkish message yields a higher probability the 
opponent arms but then there is no ambiguity about the opponent’s action. Most types 
send the Dovish message. The exception is a small number of “fairly aggressive” 
types who have a high propensity to arm but not so high as to be dominant strategy 
types. They have the incentive to send a Hawkish message; it enables them to 
coordinate with fellow “fairly aggressive” types and play ‘Build’ with the 
“aggressive” types. 
 
The “aggressive” types, on the other hand, have incentive to send a Dovish message 
as it enables them to pool with “normal” types and arm unilaterally. “Normal” types 
have incentive to send a Dovish message, as they will pool with “aggressive” types if 
they are faced sufficiently infrequently. If the number of “aggressive” types is very 
small, then the number of peaceful types is closer to one, so the probability is close to 
one that both states are Dovish and refrain from acquiring weapons. Ex ante, the 
“normal” types are better off trusting an opponent who appears Dovish. The “fairly 
aggressive” types, however, are not willing to take this gamble. The only way to 
prevent “aggressive” types arming unilaterally against “normal” opponents would be 
to get the “aggressive” types to reveal their true nature, alerting the opponent that they 
should arm too. This would not be incentive compatible though, since the 
“aggressive” type does not want his opponent to arm. 
 
Therefore, “aggressive” and “normal” types minimize the probability their opponents 
arm whereas the “fairly aggressive” types minimize the probability of coordination 
failure. This is a non-monotonic equilibrium where types with the highest and lowest 
costs pool with the intermediate type separating out. 
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In summary; if the two states send different messages, the result is an arms race and 
both states acquire new weapons; if both states sent Hawkish messages, then neither 
acquires any weapons; if both states sent Dovish messages, then the “aggressive” 
types acquire new weapons, while the remaining types do not. 
 
2.4 Experiment 
 
We consider a discrete version of the Baliga Sjostrom model. There are three type of 
players; “aggressive” (type A, with costs cL), “fairly aggressive” (type B with costs cM 
) and “normal” (type C with costs cH). The game and payoff are described below. 
 
2.4.1 Parameters within the Experiment 	  
 
Treatment 1: ‘Multiplier Condition’ does not hold 
We have set cH equal to 9 for “normal” types, cM is 5.1 for “fairly aggressive” types 
and cL is 3 for “aggressive” types. The disutility of being less advantaged, d, is 11 and 
the gain of being more advantaged,  !, is 5. These ensure that player with costs cM will 
play ‘Build’ on the anticipation that cL will play ‘Build’. This creates a contagion 
where a player with cost cH will also play ‘Build’. 
 
 
Build Not Build 
 
Build 
 
 
−ci 
 
5−ci 
 
Not Build 
 
 
-11 
 
0  
 
Figure 2.3: Payoff matrix of Player i with values of d and ! inserted 
 
 
	  	  
43	  
Treatment 2: ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds 
When the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, F(c)d ≥ c for all c, and so; cM is 5.1 for 
“fairly aggressive” types, cL is 3 for “aggressive” types but we lower cH equal to 8 for 
“normal” types. 
 
The probability of being an “aggressive” type is 0.1, the probability of being a “fairly 
aggressive” type is 0.4 and the probability of being a “normal” type is 0.5 across both 
treatments. These ensure that even if all cM play ‘Build’. The types with costs cH may 
co-ordinate and play ‘Not Build’. 
 
Treatments 3 and 4 introduce pre play communication with and without the 
‘Multiplier Condition’.  
 
2.4.2 Experimental Design 
 
The experiment has a 2x2 between-subject design. Overall, the design consists of a 
one-shot game with four treatment conditions (See Table 2.1). In Treatment 1, there is 
no communication and the ‘Multiplier Condition’ does not hold. In Treatment 2, there 
is no communication but the ‘Multiplier Condition’ does hold. In Treatment 3, there is 
two-sided communication (cheap-talk is enabled) and the ‘Multiplier Condition’ does 
not hold. During the pre-play communication phase, each subject in a pair was asked 
to send free form message s. In Treatment 4, there is both cheap-talk and the 
‘Multiplier Condition’ holds too. Treatment 1 serves as a baseline, Treatment 2 gives 
the pure ‘Multiplier Condition’ effect, Treatment 3 and 4 look at the effect of cheap-
talk both when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds (Treatment 4) and when it does not 
(Treatment 3). 
 
Subjects were only allowed to participate in one session and, therefore, only one 
treatment, with an anonymous opponent. We chose to conduct separate subjects per 
treatment, to rule out any dependence on what happened in the previous treatment. 
There were a total of 160 participants, as each treatment included two sessions with 
20 participants in each. Treating each game as an independent observation, this gave 
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10 independent observations per session and a total of 20 independent observations 
per treatment. 
 
With a prior probability, the subjects were assigned a type; Type A (the low-cost type 
in the model), Type B (the medium-cost type) or Type C (the high-cost type). They 
were not simply given their possible payoffs from each action which depended on 
what their opponent played. Furthermore, their actions were not referred to as ‘Build’ 
or ‘Not Build’, but rather as ‘Option X’ or ‘Option Y’, respectively. Thus, instead of 
‘Build’ or ‘Not Build’; in the experiment neutral framing was used to describe these 
two actions. The payoff structure of the game, including the percentage of types in the 
experiment, was known. However, the type of each player was private information. 
Thus, the players knew their own type but not the other player’s type. The types were 
drawn from a computer programmed with a probability of being either one of the 
three with probabilities given as above. 
 
In order to avoid the participants facing negative outcomes, the payoffs were scaled 
up by 14 points to ensure positive payoffs for everyone. The exchange rate was 1 
point equaling £0.50p. 
 
Build Not Build 
 
Build 
 
 
14-ci  
 
19 – ci 
 
Not Build 
 
 
3  
 
14 
 
Figure 2.4: Payoff matrix for Player i when scaled 
 
When the players were allowed to communicate, free-form costless messages were 
exchanged simultaneously in a time limited communication structure. While this was 
somewhat different from the messages in the model by Baliga and Sjostrom, this still 
captured the idea of using costless communication.  
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First, players were given instructions and asked to complete a quiz to make sure they 
had understood the information given. An experimenter read the instructions aloud 
and the experiment only began once all of the participants had answered the quiz’s 
questions correctly. Then, they were assigned their type.1 
 
In the next stage, players were matched in groups of two. As the players’ payoffs 
differed depending on what type they were exogenously assigned, we provided a 
number of payoff matrices to show all of the possible outcomes for the participants 
from facing each type. The sets of payoff matrices are shown in Figure 5, Figure 6 
and Figure 7. We have provided the screenshots from the experiment2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Payoff matrices for Type A players in Treatment 1 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Full	  instructions	  are	  included	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  2	  Payoff	  matrices	  for	  treatments	  with	  and	  without	  the	  ‘Multiplier	  Condition’	  are	  in	  the	  Appendix.	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Figure 2.6: Payoff matrices for Type B players in Treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Payoff matrices for Type C players in Treatment 1 
 
In Treatments 3 and 4, free-form costless messages were exchanged simultaneously 
before participants submitted their decisions.  
Belief elicitation: Beliefs about their opponent’s behaviour were elicited. They were 
asked to indicate which option (X or Y) they thought each type they could be matched 
with, will choose. If they correctly estimated the actual choice made by their 
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opponent, they received £2, thus there were incentives for correct elicitation of 
beliefs. 
 
At the end of the game, the outcomes were disclosed to each person and everyone was 
paid privately. The final screen reported their type and their choice, their opponent’s 
type and their choice, the total points they earned, the total points they earned in 
pounds, their earnings from the belief elicitation, their £2.50 show up fee, plus their 
corresponding final pound payment. Before they left the laboratory, participants were 
asked to complete a short questionnaire providing information such as their gender 
and how clearly they thought the instructions had been.3 
 
2.4.3 Experimental procedures 
 
The experiment was programmed with z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and all 
subjects were recruited at the University of Birmingham, using ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2015). The experiment was conducted at the Birmingham Experimental 
Economics Laboratory. In total, 160 subjects participated in the experiment with 40 
subjects per treatment. We ran two sessions per treatment, therefore, there were 20 
subjects in each session. At the end of each session, subjects were privately paid 
according to their total amount of experimental currency units (ECUs), using an 
exchange rate of £0.50 per ECU. Average earnings (excluding a show- up fee of 
£2.50) were £7.10. Sessions lasted 40 minutes, on average.  
 
2.5 Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we present our theoretical hypotheses and discuss which ones hold and 
which do not.  
Our first hypothesis is to check if people play the aggressive strategy more frequently 
when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds than when it does not. As shown in Baliga and 
Sjostrom, if the ‘Multiplier Condition’ is satisfied, there is a unique Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium where all types choose to acquire weapons whereas when it does not, 
other equilibria exist. When the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds in Treatment 2, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  questionnaire	  is	  included	  in	  the	  Appendix.	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expect all types to choose X, including Type C while we don’t expect this to be true 
in Treatment 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Null Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X in Treatment 2 is at most the frequency of X in Treatment 1. 
Alternate Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X is greater in Treatment 2 compared to Treatment 1. 
 
In order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be greater in Treatment 2 than in 
Treatment 1. 
 
BS, 2004 also predict that if the probability that the player is an “aggressive” type is 
very small, then, using cheap-talk, there is an equilibrium where the probability of an 
arms race is close to zero. We test two hypotheses in regards to communication. 
Firstly, we consider the choice of individuals in the first and last treatments. In 
Treatment 1, there is no communication nor does the ‘Multiplier Condition’ hold. 
Treatment 4 shows the full interaction of the ‘Multiplier Condition’ and 
communication, and we predict more types will then play Y. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Null Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X in Treatment 4 is at least the frequency of X in Treatment 1. 
Alternate Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X is lesser in Treatment 4 compared to Treatment 1. 
 
In order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be lesser in Treatment 4 than in 
Treatment 1. 
 
Furthermore, we test whether communication even with the ‘Multiplier Condition’ 
holding, as the BS theorem states in Cheap-Talk model, that if the condition holds, 
more people will play ‘Not Build’. We make a comparison between the data from 
Treatment 2 and Treatment 4. In Treatment 2, the ‘Multiplier Condition’ does not 
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hold but there is communication. Whereas, in Treatment 4, the ‘Multiplier Condition; 
holds and there is communication. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Null Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X in Treatment 4 is at least the frequency of X in Treatment 2. 
Alternate Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X is lesser in Treatment 4 compared to Treatment 2. 
 
In order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be lesser in Treatment 4 than in 
Treatment 2. 
 
2.6 Results 
 
In this section, we present the findings from our experiment and see if our hypotheses 
hold. 
 
We present our analysis in two parts. First, we give a descriptive analysis; checking 
whether there are differences in the frequency of X between treatments and formally 
examining whether or not there are statistically significant differences in the observed 
frequencies among treatments by using a non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test. 
Then, we use multivariate probit regressions to see if the differences hold after we 
include a host of control variables that are likely to affect the dependent variable we 
consider. 
 
2.6.1 Hypothesis 1: The effect of the ‘Multiplier Condition’ 
 
Based on the model by Baliga and Sjostrom, we can predict that the ‘Multiplier 
Condition’ will affect whether all types prefer to play X. The paper states that if the 
‘Multiplier Condition’ is satisfied, there is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where 
all types choose to acquire weapons. To test this hypothesis, we consider the 
frequency of X in the first two treatments as Treatment 1 is the baseline and 
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Treatment 2 shows the pure effect of the ‘Multiplier Condition’. In order to reject the 
null, the frequency of X must be greater in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. 
 
We look at the observed frequencies of how often the individual’s chose X. Each 
treatment consisted of 80 subjects. Our data shows that there is an increase of four 
participants choosing X when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ held. 
 
 	  Figure	  2.8:	  Frequency	  of	  X	  in	  Treatments	  1	  and	  2	  
 
We can also look at the proportion of X within the individual observations. An 
individual observation consists of a group of two subjects. We measure the proportion 
of X by showing the percentage of each group that chose X; so if both members chose 
X, the group is assigned 100. The frequency of the outcome (X,X) increased from six 
groups (out of 20) to nine groups. This represents the number of groups in which both 
subjects chose X, and shows an increase of 50%. The frequency of the outcome (Y,Y) 
decreased from 18 individual observations to 14, meaning it has fallen by 22%. These 
results seem to support our first hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Proportion of X within individual observations in Treatments 1 and 2 
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We consider the proportion of X within the individual observations and present, in the 
table below, the means of Treatment 1 and 2. 
 
Table 2.2: Mean proportion of X within individual observations in Treatment 1 and 2 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Mean 55 65 
 
If all participants chose X, the mean would be 100. From Table 2.2, we observe that 
the mean proportion of choosing X in each group is 55 in Treatment 1, and 65 in 
Treatment 2. Therefore, Treatment 2 has a mean that is 27% higher, supporting our 
hypothesis. This indicates that there are differences in the frequency of X between 
treatments. We now formally examine whether the differences in the observed 
frequencies in our treatments are statistically significant, by using a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon ranksum test, and report the corresponding p-values from the test 
performed for a pairwise comparison. It tests the hypothesis that two independent 
samples (that is, unmatched data) are from populations with the same distribution. 
 
For Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, the p-value for differences in choosing X was 
0.3634. We find that we cannot reject the null and, therefore, it is statistically 
insignificant and we cannot reject that the two populations have similar distributions, 
even at a 10% level of significance. As the frequency of X has not differed greatly 
between the treatments, there is no significant effect from the ‘Multiplier Condition’ 
alone. 
 
Result 1 There is no significant difference in the frequency of X between Treatment 1 
and Treatment 2; participants do not choose X more or less when the ‘Multiplier 
Condition’ holds. 
 
2.6.2 Hypothesis 2: The effect of the ‘Multiplier Condition’ and Communication 
 
We first broadly look at the effect of communication. To test this hypothesis, we 
consider the frequency of X in the first and last treatments. Our experiment also 
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includes Treatment 3, which shows the pure effect of communication. Further in our 
results, we shall analyze this separately. For now, in order to not reject the null, the 
frequency of X must be lesser in Treatment 4 than in Treatment 1. 
 
The observed frequency of X decreases from 22 individuals to three when the 
‘Multiplier Condition’ holds and the participants are allowed to communicate. This is 
a reduction by 86%, which supports our hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Frequency of X in Treatments 1 and 4 
 
The number of groups that chose the outcomes (X,X) and (X,Y) decreased 
significantly. No groups chose (X,X) in Treatment 4, and only three chose (X,Y). The 
number of groups that chose (Y,Y) increased over double from 18 groups to 37.  All 
of this is conducive to our second hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Proportion of X within individual observations in Treatments 1 and 4 
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From Table 2.3, we observe that the mean proportion of choosing X within an 
individual observation decreases from 55 to 7.5. This means it is almost 86% lower in 
Treatment 4 than in Treatment 1.  
 
Table 2.3: Mean proportion of X within individual observations in Treatment 1 and 4 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 4 
Mean 55 7.5 
 
We also conducted a non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test for Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 4. The p-value for differences in choosing X was 0.0000. We find that we 
can reject the null and, therefore, there is a significant difference between the two 
treatments in this respect, even at a 1% level of significance. This means that 
Treatment 1 and Treatment 4 do not have similar distributions, the frequency of X 
differs greatly between the treatments and there is a significant effect from the 
‘Multiplier Condition’ when there is communication. 
 
Result 2 There is a significant difference in the frequency of X between Treatment 1 
and Treatment 4; participants choose X less if they can communicate and the 
‘Multiplier Condition’ holds. 
 
2.6.3 Hypothesis 3: The effect of Communication 
 
In their Cheap-Talk model, Baliga and Sjostrom’s theorem states that if the 
‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, a higher frequency of people will play ‘Not Build’. We 
make a comparison between the data from Treatment 2 and Treatment 4. In order to 
not reject the null, the frequency of X must be lesser in Treatment 4 than in Treatment 
2. 
 
There is a reduction of 23 participants choosing X; from 26 individuals to three 
between treatments. This is a reduction by 88%, which supports our hypothesis. 
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Figure 2.12: Frequency of X in Treatments 2 and 4 
 
Similar to Hypothesis 2, the number of groups that chose the outcomes (X,X) and 
(X,Y) decreased significantly, whereas the number of groups that chose (Y,Y) 
increased from 14 groups to 37.  All of this is conducive to our third hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Proportion of X within individual observations in Treatments 2 and 4 
 
The mean proportion of choosing X within the individual observations decreased by 
88%; from 65 to 7.5. The p-value from the non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test 
was 0.0000. We reject the null and find that there is a significant difference between 
the two treatments at a 1% level of significance. 
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Table 2.4: Mean proportion of X within individual observations in Treatment 2 and 4 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 4 
Mean 65 7.5 
 
This means that Treatment 2 and Treatment 4 do not have similar distributions, the 
frequency of X differs greatly between the treatments and there is a significant effect 
from communication when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds. 
 
Result 3 There is a significant difference in the frequency of X between Treatment 2 
and Treatment 4; when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, participants choose X less 
when they can communicate. 
 
2.6.4 The effect of the ‘Multiplier Condition’ 
 
Our results have shown that the difference between Treatments 1 and 2 and Treatment 
4 is statistically significant. To gain a better understanding of the underlying 
processes, we can investigate the individual effect of communication by using 
Treatment 3, particularly as the ‘Multiplier Condition’ does not give statistically 
significant results from when it does not hold (See Hypothesis 1). This will enable us 
to question whether the effect is from communication alone. The exact frequencies of 
all treatments are presented in Table 2.5 below. 
 
Table 2.5: Frequency of X in all treatments 
 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
Frequency of X 22 26 3 3 
 
As shown in Table 2.5, there is no difference between Treatment 3 and 4, when 
comparing the frequency of X. The mean proportions (within individual observations) 
of all treatments are presented in Table 2.6, and we can see this doesn’t differ either. 
It remains at 7.5 when there is communication, whether the ‘Multiplier Condition’ 
holds or not. 
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Table 2.6: Mean proportion of X within individual observations in all treatments 
 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
Mean 55 65 7.5 7.5 
 
We performed Wilcoxon ranksum tests for each pair of treatments. The results are 
given below in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7: p-values from Wilcoxon ranksum tests for all treatments 
 
 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
Treatment 1 0.3634 0.0000 0.0000 
Treatment 2 - 0.0000 0.0000 
Treatment 3 0.0000 - 0.6886 
 
We can reject that the data from Treatment 1 (and 2) and 3 have similar distributions, 
so there is an effect from communication. We can also reject that the data from 
Treatments 1 and 2 and 4 have similar distributions, showing that there is an effect 
from full interaction. However, as the data from Treatment 3 and 4 have similar 
distributions, and as Result 1 means there is no effect from the ‘Multiplier Condition’, 
this indicates that the change in frequency is likely to be caused by communication 
alone.  
 
2.6.5 Regression Analysis 
 
As the non-parametric statistical test does not control for other characteristics that 
may affect an individual’s decision, we also use a multivariate regression to address 
our hypotheses. To assess the differences among the treatments, we first run a probit 
regression using the raw data for each individual observation. We use a probit model 
as the dependent variable is binary. We will estimate the probability that an 
observation with particular characteristics will fall into a specific one of the 
categories. Probit models, which employ a probit link function, are most often 
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estimated using the standard maximum likelihood procedure. This is what we shall 
use to estimate our regression. 
 
The dependent variable Choice is binary; it can have only two possible outcomes, 
which we will denote as 1 and 0. Choice takes a value of 1 if the individual chose X 
and a value of 0 if the individual chose Y.  
In our first regression, Model 1, we include the following independent variables: 
1. Treatment2, Treatment3, Treatment4: binary variables that takes value 1 when 
the data belongs to that treatment. 
2. Type: that takes a value of 1 if the individual is of Type A, a value of 2 if the 
individual is of Type B and a value of 3 if the individual is of Type C. 
 
We have 20 observations from each treatment, giving a total of 80 overall. We present 
the coefficients for these variables from the probit regression with robust standard 
errors clustered on independent matching groups.  
 
Table 2.8: Probit regression results for Model 1 
 
No. of Obs.: 160; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow. 
Treatment2 0.27 
(0.29) 
Treatment3 -1.66 *** 
(0.37) 
Treatment4 -1.64 *** 
(0.37) 
Type -0.51 *** 
(0.18) 
Constant 1.37 *** 
(0.49) 
Pseudo R2: 0.3092 
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There are limited ways in which we can interpret the individual regression 
coefficients. A positive coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to an 
increase in the predicted probability. So, for example, the coefficient of Type is -0.51. 
This means that a decrease in Type (being Type A rather than Type C) could increase 
the predicted probability of X being chosen. The results also show that the predicted 
probability of X being chosen decreased from Treatment 1 to Treatment 3, as well as 
from Treatment 1 to Treatment 4. The predicted probability increased from Treatment 
1 to Treatment 2 though, so the probit regression suggests more people would choose 
X when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds, unless there is any communication, when 
the number of people is more likely to fall. 
 
We use the probability the z test statistic would be observed under the null hypothesis 
that a particular predictor’s regression coefficient is zero, given that the rest of the 
predictors are in the model. For a given alpha level, it determines whether or not the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. If it is less than alpha, then the null hypothesis can be 
rejected and the parameter estimate is considered statistically significant at that alpha 
level. We use, following standard notations, * to denote statistical significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. For example, with Treatment2, 
when we set our alpha level to 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and we can 
conclude that the regression coefficient for Treatment 2 has not been found to be 
statistically different from zero, given the other regressors are in the model. 
 
In Table 2.8, we are mainly interested in the Treatment variable. As Treatment2 does 
not seem to have an effect on the predicted probability of the frequency of X, we can 
conclude that Result 1 still holds. The table clearly indicates significant differences 
between Treatments 3 and 4 with the baseline. As there is a negative coefficient, the 
regression above shows that the frequency of X significantly decreases when 
communication is enabled. Hypothesis 2 has not been rejected; we find supporting 
evidence for the hypothesis that the frequency of X increases when they can 
communicate and the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holds. 
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As Type increases, that is, as a participant becomes a less aggressive type, the 
predicted probability of the frequency of X falls. This variable is significant, even at a 
1% level. 
 
Table 2.9: Probit regression results for Model 2, 3 and 4 
 
No. of Obs.: 160; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow. 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment2 -1.01 
(1.34) 
0.08 
(0.35) 
-1.35 
(1.45) 
Treatment3 -2.82 * 
(1.44) 
-1.45 *** 
(0.49) 
-3.69 ** 
(1.61) 
Treatment4 -3.02 ** 
(1.46) 
-1.40 *** 
(0.49) 
-3.93 ** 
(1.61) 
Type -1.09 *** 
(0.38) 
-0.6 *** 
(0.23) 
-1.15 *** 
(0.40) 
T2 0.54 
(0.52) 
- 0.58 
(0.56) 
T3 0.70 
(0.61) 
- 0.95 
(0.66) 
T4 0.85 
(0.60) 
- 1.09 * 
(0.65) 
Constant 2.05** 
(0.94) 
0.10 
(0.71) 
2.47 ** 
(1.12) 
 Pseudo R2: 0.4298 Pseudo R2: 0.4670 Pseudo R2: 4852 
 
We then conducted another regression, which included interactive terms. These 
variables deal with the non-independence of the types and the treatments. The 
relationship between the participants’ types and the frequency of X, changes 
depending on the treatment they were in. For example, according to our model, a 
Type C (“normal”) participant should play Y in Treatment 1, whereas they should 
play X in Treatment 2. 
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We now include the following additional independent variables: 
1. T2: Treatment2*Type 
2. T3: Treatment3*Type 
3. T4: Treatment4*Type 
 
We present the results of the probit regression of differences in choosing X for each 
treatment with interactive terms in Table 2.9, labeling it Model 2. 
 
Treatment3, Treatment4, and Type are still significant, however, none of the 
interactive terms appear to be significant. Statistically, the treatment variables and 
interactive terms are correlated. It is possible that the treatment variable may be 
picking up all the effects of the interactive terms. 
 
We then conducted further regressions to include control variables. We included the 
following: 
1. Gender: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant is female. 
2. Studies: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant has 
studied Economics previously, and may therefore be familiar with the 
game. 
3. Religion: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant reports 
to have any religious inclination. 
4. Instructions: that takes a value of 0 if the individual found the instructions 
‘Very Unclear’, a value of 1 if the individual found them ‘Unclear’, a 
value of 2 if the individual found them ‘Neutral’, a value of 3 if the 
individual found them ‘Clear’ and a value of 4 if they found the 
instructions ‘Very Clear’. No participants in this experiment reported that 
they had found the instructions ‘Unclear’ or ‘Very Unclear’. 
5. Belief: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant believed 
their opponent would play X. When participants elicited their beliefs, we 
checked if they thought the type they were actually matched with, would 
play X. 
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In Table 2.9, the results of the probit regression of differences in choosing X for each 
treatment with controls, is labeled Model 3. There does not appear to be any obvious 
changes by introducing the controls, without any interactive terms. However, looking 
at Model 4, the results of the probit regression of differences in choosing X for each 
treatment with interactive terms and controls, Treatment4 gets statistically stronger 
and T4 also becomes significant at a 10% level. This supports our second result, as the 
type of a participant and the frequency of X is affected by whether they participated in 
Treatment 4, in which there was a full interaction. 
 
Gender also appeared significant at a 10% level with a negative probability, 
suggesting that males were more likely to choose X. Religion is significant at a 5% 
level and had a positive coefficient. This means that people who did not identify 
themselves with a religion behaved less aggressively. Belief was statistically 
significant at a 1% level with a positive coefficient, meaning that if a participant 
believed their opponent would play X, they would choose X too. Studies also had a 
negative coefficient, as did Instructions when the interactive terms were included, but 
neither of these regressors had statistical significance at an acceptable level of 
significance.4 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
We conducted a set of experiments to show how an arms race scenario can be 
triggered and the role of communication in reducing the possibility of such a race. We 
used two sets of parameters, based on the Baliga and Sjostrom paper, to model when 
the ‘Multiplier Condition’ didn’t hold and when it did hold. We found under both 
treatments, a high frequency of subjects chose to build, indicating the possibility of an 
arms race spiral regardless of whether the Condition held. We then showed how non-
binding communication significantly lowers the probability of an arms race. 
Participants seemed to have created credible information about their opponents’ types 
via communication. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A table showing these regression outputs is included in the Appendix.	  
	  	  
62	  
Thus, the empirical results supported Hypotheses 2 and 3 but not Hypothesis 1. There 
was no significant difference in the frequency of X between Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 2, meaning that participants do not choose X more when the ‘Multiplier 
Condition’ holds. It is possible that the difference between the treatments is not 
statistically significant because the results from the ‘Multiplier Condition’ requires a 
high order iteration of beliefs that the participants of the experiment have not been 
able to do. For the ‘Multiplier Condition’ to hold, a player needed beliefs and beliefs 
over beliefs, etc. due to the lack of common knowledge available on each other’s 
types (as in, Rubenstein, 1989). They also need common knowledge of beliefs. All 
rational players will believe dominant strategy types will play X, and they will also 
believe that the “almost” dominant strategy types will play X if they know the 
dominant strategy types will do so. The contagion takes hold as they have the same 
beliefs of the “almost-almost” dominant strategy types, and so on. Moreover, it should 
be noted that there is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where all types choose to acquire 
weapons, without the ‘Multiplier Condition’ holding. Thus, it could simply be the 
case that subjects ended up playing the equilibrium in which they all build (play X) 
even when there was another equilibrium. 
 
There was a significant difference in the frequency of X between Treatments 1 and 2 
and Treatment 4, showing participants choose X more both when the ‘Multiplier 
Condition’ holds and it does not and they can communicate. This implies that cheap-
talk can enable players to coordinate on a Pareto dominant equilibrium, providing the 
probability of facing an “aggressive” type is sufficiently small. 
 
As the data from Treatment 3 and 4 have similar distributions, and as Result 1 means 
there is no effect from the ‘Multiplier Condition’, this indicates that the change in 
frequency likely caused by communication alone. This could indicate that the 
decision to play Y is predominantly due to the participants being able to engage in 
cheap-talk. 
 
Our results suggest the positive role of communication in reaching Pareto superior 
outcomes even in the presence of incomplete information while casting doubt on the 
ability of subjects to do higher order iterations.  
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There is a possibility for future extensions. We could investigate the effect of 
repeating the game by having multiple rounds of each game, for all treatments. We 
could also look at the impact of different types of communication, in particular 
whether fixed-form messages would lead to different outcomes. This would mean a 
player would only have the option of sending two messages, for example, “I WILL 
CHOOSE OPTION X” or “I WILL CHOOSE OPTION Y.” Although previous 
experimental work suggests that the impact of communication varies with the type of 
messages, the results are yet far from conclusive (Oprea et al., 2014). In some 
designs, communication has been more structured and players make simultaneous or 
one-sided announcements (Crawford, 1997). These include Clark et al. (2001), 
Cooper et al. (1992) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991). In other designs, the 
communication’s timing and content is unstructured, such as Forsythe et al. (1991), 
Valley et al. (1996) and Roth (1987). In studies of equilibrium selection, such as 
coordination games, simple forms of anonymous communication have been shown to 
be effective. Cooper et al. (1996) show simple pre-play fixed messages are able to 
cause players to choose the efficient, payoff-dominant equilibrium. On the other hand, 
Ostrom et al. (1992) find face-to-face communication causes an increase in 
cooperation in a public-goods game. It would be interesting to compare how our 
results vary. 
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2.8 Appendix A 
 
Instructions without Communication (Treatment 1) 
	  
Preliminary Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory. This is an 
experiment in the economics of decision-making. The funding for this research has 
been provided by various research foundations. Just for showing up, you have already 
earned a show up fee of £2.50. You can earn additional money depending on the 
decisions made by you and other participants. It is very important that you read the 
instructions carefully. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of 
these rules. 
We will first go over the instructions together. After we have read the instructions, 
you will have time to ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any 
decisions you make in this experiment are completely anonymous. Please do not 
touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
The experiment consists of one round. You will be paid according to the number of 
points you have collected in that round with the following exchange rate: 
1 point = £0.50p 
You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
Type and Matching 
In this experiment, you will be randomly assigned a type by the computer, either 
‘Type A’, ‘Type B’ or ‘Type C’. Your type will remain the same throughout the 
whole experiment. In total there are 20 participants in this room; 10% will be 
assigned the role of Type A, 40% will be assigned the role of Type B and the 
remaining 50% of the participants will be assigned the role of Type C. You will be 
informed of your type but not of the other participants’ types. 
At the beginning of the round, you will be matched with one other person, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of two. You will therefore 
be in a group with one other participant. You will never learn the identity of the other 
participant you are matched with, nor will the other participants be informed about 
your identity. 
 
The Decision Stage 
You and the other participant you are matched with have to simultaneously select 
one of two options, either OPTION X or OPTION Y. When you make your own 
choice, you do not know what the other participant’s choice is. Your type and the 
decisions made by both of you will determine the points you each get, as shown in the 
following tables. The first number in each cell indicates your points, and the second 
the other participant’s points.  
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Payoff tables for Type A: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   11,	  11	   16,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  16	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   11,	  8.9	   16,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  13.9	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   11,	  5	   16,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  10	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  
 
Payoff tables for Type B: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   8.9,	  11	   13.9,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  16	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   8.9,	  8.9	   13.9,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  13.9	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   8.9,	  5	   13.9,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  10	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  
 
Payoff tables for Type C: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5,	  11	   10,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  16	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5,	  8.9	   10,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  13.9	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5,	  5	   10,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  10	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  
 
For example, suppose that you are Type A and the other participant you are matched 
with is Type B. If you choose OPTION X and they choose OPTION Y, then you will 
earn 16 points and the other participant will earn 3 points. 
The Decision Screen  
You will enter your decisions on a screen that looks as follows. The example below is 
used for illustrative purposes. This screenshot corresponds to the case where you are 
Type A. In the actual experiment, you can be Type A, Type B or Type C as 
mentioned earlier in the instructions. 
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As mentioned before, before you make your decision, you will be informed of your 
Type and the payoff tables for facing each type. You must select one of two options, 
either OPTION X or OPTION Y. To make your choice, you simply select the 
appropriate button and then click on the ‘Submit’ button by using your mouse. Once 
you have pressed the ‘Submit’ button, you can no longer revise your decision. 
 
Belief Elicitation 
On the next screen, you are asked to indicate which of the two options (OPTION X or 
OPTION Y) each type of the other person you could be matched with will choose. 
You will make your choices on a screen that looks as follows. 
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If you correctly estimate the actual choice made by the participant you are matched 
with, you will receive £2. 
Ending of the Experiment 
When both you and the other participant you are matched with have made your 
decisions, you will see a final screen reporting your type and your choice, the other 
participant’s type and their choice, the total points you have earned, the total points 
you have earned in £, your earnings from the belief elicitation, your show up fee, plus 
the corresponding final £ payment. You will be paid £0.50p for every point and £2 if 
you estimate the other participant’s choice correctly, in addition to your £2.50 show-
up fee. 
Do you have any questions? Please do not ask any questions out loud. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. 
 
 
Control Questions 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please complete the questions 
below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk to check your answers. 
Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the experiment will start. 
(The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for illustrative 
purposes. In the experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices 
of the participants.) 
 
1. Will your type change or remain the same throughout the experiment? (Please 
circle the correct answer). 
SAME / CHANGE 
 
2. How many ‘Type A’ participants are there in this experiment?     
………… 
 
3. If you are a ‘Type A’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type B’ participant and… 
 a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
4. If you are a ‘Type B’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION Y when matched with a ‘Type C’ participant and… 
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
5. If you are a ‘Type C’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type A’ participant and…  
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
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2.9 Appendix B 
 
Instructions with Communication (Treatment 3) 
 
Preliminary Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory. This is an 
experiment in the economics of decision-making. The funding for this research has 
been provided by various research foundations. Just for showing up, you have already 
earned a show up fee of £2.50. You can earn additional money depending on the 
decisions made by you and other participants. It is very important that you read the 
instructions carefully. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of 
these rules. 
We will first go over the instructions together. After we have read the instructions, 
you will have time to ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any 
decisions you make in this experiment are completely anonymous. Please do not 
touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
The experiment consists of one round. You will be paid according to the number of 
points you have collected in that round with the following exchange rate: 
1 point = £0.50p 
You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Instructions 
 
Type and Matching 
In this experiment, you will be randomly assigned a type by the computer, either 
‘Type A’, ‘Type B’ or ‘Type C’. Your type will remain the same throughout the 
whole experiment. In total there are 20 participants in this room; 10% will be 
assigned the role of Type A, 40% will be assigned the role of Type B and the 
remaining 50% of the participants will be assigned the role of Type C. You will be 
informed of your type but not of the other participants’ types. 
At the beginning of the round, you will be matched with one other person, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of two. You will therefore 
be in a group with one other participant. You will never learn the identity of the other 
participant you are matched with, nor will the other participants be informed about 
your identity. 
The round consists of two stages: i) the Chat stage and ii) the Decision stage.  
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i) The Chat Stage 
 
You are given 180 seconds (3 minutes) in which you can use a chat program to write 
messages to the participant you are matched with. 
 
When you use the chat program, you can type whatever you want in the lower box of 
the chat program, except for the following restrictions. 
 
Restrictions on messages: 
 
1. You must not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to 
identify you (for example, your name, contact details or seat in the room) 
2. You must not make any threats, insults or use any obscene or offensive language. 
If you violate these rules your payment will be forfeited. 
 
Messages will be shared only between you and the participant you are matched with. 
You will not be able to see the messages of the other groups and the other groups will 
not see the messages in your chat. 
 
Once 180 seconds have elapsed, we will proceed to the ‘Decision Stage’. 
 
 
ii) The Decision Stage 
You and the other participant you are matched with have to simultaneously select 
one of two options, either OPTION X or OPTION Y. When you make your own 
choice, you do not know what the other participant’s choice is. Your type and the 
decisions made by both of you will determine the points you each get, as shown in the 
following tables. The first number in each cell indicates your points, and the second 
the other participant’s points.  
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Payoff tables for Type A: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   11,	  11	   16,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  16	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   11,	  8.9	   16,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  13.9	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   11,	  5	   16,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  10	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  
 
Payoff tables for Type B: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   8.9,	  11	   13.9,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  16	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   8.9,	  8.9	   13.9,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  13.9	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   8.9,	  5	   13.9,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  10	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  
 
Payoff tables for Type C: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5,	  11	   10,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  16	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5,	  8.9	   10,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  13.9	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5,	  5	   10,	  3	  OPTION	  Y	   3,	  10	   14,	  14	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  
 
 
For example, suppose that you are Type A and the other participant you are matched 
with is Type B. If you choose OPTION X and they choose OPTION Y, then you will 
earn 16 points and the other participant will earn 3 points. 
 
 
The Decision Screen  
You will enter your decisions on a screen that looks as follows. The example below is 
used for illustrative purposes. This screenshot corresponds to the case where you are 
Type A. In the actual experiment, you can be Type A, Type B or Type C as 
mentioned earlier in the instructions. 
 
	  	  
71	  
 
 
As mentioned before, before you make your decision, you will be informed of your 
Type and the payoff tables for facing each type. You must select one of two options, 
either OPTION X or OPTION Y. To make your choice, you simply select the 
appropriate button and then click on the ‘Submit’ button by using your mouse. Once 
you have pressed the ‘Submit’ button, you can no longer revise your decision. 
 
Belief Elicitation 
On the next screen, you are asked to indicate which of the two options (OPTION X or 
OPTION Y) each type of the other person you could be matched with will choose. 
You will make your choices on a screen that looks as follows. 
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If you correctly estimate the actual choice made by the participant you are matched 
with, you will receive £2. 
Ending of the Experiment 
When both you and the other participant you are matched with have made your 
decisions, you will see a final screen reporting your type and your choice, the other 
participant’s type and their choice, the total points you have earned, the total points 
you have earned in £, your earnings from the belief elicitation, your show up fee, plus 
the corresponding final £ payment. You will be paid £0.50p for every point and £2 if 
you estimate the other participant’s choice correctly, in addition to your £2.50 show-
up fee. 
Do you have any questions? Please do not ask any questions out loud. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. 
 
 
Control Questions 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please complete the questions 
below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk to check your answers. 
Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the experiment will start. 
(The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for illustrative 
purposes. In the experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices 
of the participants.) 
 
1. Will your type change or remain the same throughout the experiment? (Please 
circle the correct answer). 
SAME / CHANGE 
 
2. How many ‘Type A’ participants are there in this experiment?     
………… 
 
3. If you are a ‘Type A’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type B’ participant and… 
 a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
4. If you are a ‘Type B’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION Y when matched with a ‘Type C’ participant and… 
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
5. If you are a ‘Type C’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type A’ participant and…  
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
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2.10 Appendix C 
 
Payoff Matrices in the Experiment when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ Does Not 
Hold 
 
Payoff Tables for Type A 
 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
11, 11 
 
16, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 16 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
11, 8.9 
 
16, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 13.9 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
11, 5 
 
16, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 10 
 
 
14, 14 
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Payoff Tables for Type B 
 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
8.9, 11 
 
13.9, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 16 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
8.9, 8.9 
 
13.9, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 13.9 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
8.9, 5 
 
13.9, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 10 
 
 
14, 14 
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Payoff Tables for Type C 
 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
5, 11 
 
10, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 16 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
5, 8.9 
 
10, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 13.9 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
5, 5 
 
10, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 10 
 
 
14, 14 
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2.11 Appendix D 
 
Payoff Matrices in the Experiment when the ‘Multiplier Condition’ Holds 
 
Payoff Tables for Type A 
 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
11, 11 
 
16, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 16 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
11, 8.9 
 
16, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 13.9 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
11, 6 
 
16, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 11 
 
 
14, 14 
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Payoff Tables for Type B 
 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
8.9, 11 
 
13.9, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 16 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
8.9, 8.9 
 
13.9, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 13.9 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
8.9, 6 
 
13.9, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 11 
 
 
14, 14 
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Payoff Tables for Type C 
 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
6, 11 
 
11, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 16 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
6, 8.9 
 
11, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 13.9 
 
 
14, 14 
 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
6, 6 
 
11, 3 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3, 11 
 
 
14, 14 
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2.12 Appendix E 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Note: This questionnaire was used for all experiments. 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Please answer each of the following questions as accurately as possible. Naturally 
your responses will be completely confidential. Your answers will be of immense 
value for our scientific investigation. Thank you in advance for your cooperation. 	  
What is your gender? 	   ¢	  Female	  	   ¢	  Male	  	  
How old are you? 
 [     ] 
 
What is the degree programme you are registered for? 	   ¢	  Natural Sciences	  	   ¢	  Engineering or Computer Science	  	   ¢	  Medical Science 	   ¢	  Law	  	   ¢	  Humanities 	   ¢	  Economics or Business	  	   ¢	  Social Sciences (other than Economics/Business)	  	  
What is your nationality? 
 [     ] 
 
What is your marital status? 	   ¢	  Single	  	   ¢	  Married 	   ¢	  Separated	  	  
What is your religion? 	   ¢	  Protestant 	   ¢	  Catholic 	   ¢	  Jewish	  	   ¢	  Muslim	  	   ¢	  Hindu	  	   ¢	  Other Religions	  	   ¢	  No religion	  	  
What is the highest level of education your father has received? 	   ¢	  Primary school	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   ¢	  Secondary school	  	   ¢	  Some university	  	   ¢	  Undergraduate degree	  	   ¢	  Postgraduate degree	  	   ¢	  Not known 
 
What is the highest level of education your mother has received? 	   ¢	  Primary school	  	   ¢	  Secondary school	  	   ¢	  Some university	  	   ¢	  Undergraduate degree	  	   ¢	  Postgraduate degree	  	   ¢	  Not known 
 
Please indicate your political attitude in the following scale 	   Left	            Right 
 
How many participants of the experiment do you know by name? 
 [     ] 
 
How did you find the instructions? 	   ¢	  Very clear	  	   ¢	  Clear 	   ¢	  Neutral 	   ¢	  Unclear	  	   ¢	  Very unclear 
 
How important was it for you to maximise your own income? 	   ¢	  Very important	  	   ¢	  Important	  
¢	  Indifferent	  
¢	  Not important	  
¢	  Not important at all 
 
Thank you very much for participating in the experiment! 
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2.13 Appendix F 
 
Regression Output Table  
 
No. of Obs.: 160; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow. 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment2 0.08 
(0.35) 
-1.35 
(1.45) 
Treatment3 -1.45 *** 
(0.49) 
-3.69 ** 
(1.61) 
Treatment4 -1.40 *** 
(0.49) 
-3.93 ** 
(1.61) 
Type -0.6 *** 
(0.23) 
-1.15 *** 
(0.40) 
T2 - 0.58 
(0.56) 
T3 - 0.95 
(0.66) 
T4 - 1.09 * 
(0.65) 
Gender -0.53 * 
(0.31) 
-0.61 * 
(0.32) 
Studies -0.47 
(0.37) 
-0.52 
(0.37) 
Religion 0.80 ** 
(0.33) 
0.79 ** 
(0.33) 
Instructions -0.07 
(0.24) 
-0.12 
(0.25) 
Belief 1.74 *** 
(0.36) 
1.77 *** 
(0.37) 
Constant 0.10 
(0.71) 
2.47 ** 
(1.12) 
 Pseudo R2: 0.4670 Pseudo R2: 4852 
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Chapter 3 
Provoking conflict: Do Hawkish recommendations make 
players more aggressive? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
We experimentally look at the effect of third party recommendations in a ‘conflict 
game’ adapted from Baliga and Sjostrom (2012) to see if such recommendations can 
increase the probability of conflict. Unlike our earlier set of experiments, which also 
looked at the role of communication by the players themselves, we consider the role 
of a third player sending a message that both players can observe. Baliga and 
Sjostrom (BS, 2012) look at third party messages and shows they can increase or 
decrease conflict depending on whether the actions of the two players are strategic 
complements or substitutes. Our experiments deal with the case of strategic 
complements but we will briefly describe both cases. 
 
Similar to the previous chapter, the model is based on an augmented stag-hunt game 
with incomplete information. There are two countries (A and B) that choose D 
(peaceful strategy) or H (aggressive strategy). Types of players (“dominant strategy 
Doves”, “dominant strategy Hawks” or “moderate”) differ and are differentiated by 
their costs of aggression, which is private information. The normal form of the game 
is as below. 
Hawk (H) Dove (D) 
 
Hawk (H) 
 
 
–ci 
 
µ-ci 
 
Dove (D) 
 
 
-d 
 
0 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Payoff matrix of Player i in Baliga and Sjostrom’s (2012) model 
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BS (2012) allow actions to be Strategic Complements or Strategic Substitutes.  
Players can be “dominant strategy” Hawks or Doves in which case their best response 
is to play H and D respectively or they can be a “moderate”. A “moderate” is a player 
whose best response depends on his beliefs about the opponent’s action. In the 
Strategic Complements game, they would be a “Coordination” type; H’s Best 
Response is H and D’s Best Response is D. In a game where actions are Strategic 
Substitutes, “moderates” would be an “Opportunist” type; D’s best response is H and 
H’s best response is D. 
 
BS show that under ‘mild’ assumptions on the distribution of types, there is a unique 
Communication-Free Equilibrium for both players. If their cost is below a threshold, 
they fight, and otherwise they do not. 
 
The paper then looks at communication by third parties. A third party called E has 
perfect information about Player A’s true preferences (he knows Player A’s type) and 
wants to influence Player A’s action by signaling Player A’s preferences (type) to 
Player B. The model assumes Player E’s true preferences are commonly known, and 
Player E can only communicate by sending a publicly observed cheap-talk message 
before Player A and Player B simultaneously make their decisions. The model 
assumes Player E can only communicate, and do nothing else, in order to analyse the 
impact of third party talk on the manipulation of conflict. 
 
There are two cases within their cheap-talk model. Case 1 is where Player E is a 
Hawk (EH) and wants Player A to play H. Case 2 is where Player E is a Dove (ED) 
and wants Player A to play D. In both cases, Player E always wants Player B to play 
D. 
 
The paper finds a unique Communication Equilibrium; an equilibrium where Player 
E’s cheap-talk influences Player A’s and Player B’s decisions. As it is commonly 
known what E wants the two players to do, Player A will only listen to Player E’s 
message if he thinks it might influence Player B.  
 
For the Communication Equilibrium, BS (2012) looks at which case (Case 1 with 
Player EH or Case 2 Player ED) creates effective cheap-talk in the Strategic 
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Complements game and the Strategic Substitutes game. Without loss of generality, 
they assume two messages m1 (Hawkish) and m0 (peaceful) can be sent. 
 
In the Strategic Complements game, EH will send m1 only if A is more likely to play 
H as a result; they wish to indirectly influence Player A by publicly provoking Player 
B, m1 will make Player B likely to play H as it signals information about player A’s 
type. As actions are strategic complements, it makes Type A play H with a higher 
probability as well. Therefore, EH can communicate effectively via a Hawkish 
message by increasing tension and inducing a fear spiral. In equilibrium, EH sends m1 
when Player A is “weak moderate” (a “Coordination” type) i.e. Player A chooses H if 
provocation makes Player B choose H, and Player A chooses D without cheap-talk. 
Otherwise, EH sends mo i.e. in a situation when Player A’s action does not depend on 
the message. This is because it increases the probability that Player B plays D. Player 
A’s action will not depend on the message if their costs are below a threshold and 
therefore, they are “dominant strategy” types. It is worth noting that eliminating EH 
makes everyone strictly better off because both want their opponents to play D.  
 
What happens when the Recommender is ED, who will want both players to choose D: 
In the Strategic Complements game, he must always send mo in equilibrium. 
However, always sending the same message is not informative, thus the outcome is 
equivalent to the unique Communication-Free Equilibrium and cheap-talk is 
ineffective. 
 
However, in the Strategic Substitutes game, ED will send m1 only if it makes Player A 
more likely to play D, whilst m1 will also make Player B more likely to play H. As 
with the Strategic Complements game, Player A is indirectly influenced by the 
message; when Player B becomes more Hawkish, Player A backs down and plays D. 
ED can communicate effectively via a Hawkish message by reducing tension and 
causing Player A to back down. In equilibrium, ED sends m1 when A is a “tough 
moderate” (an “Opportunist” type) i.e. Player A chooses D if he fears provocation 
makes Player B choose H, (note Player A chooses H without cheap-talk). Otherwise, 
ED sends mo. As Player A becomes more Dovish, Player B becomes better off.  
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Thus, m1, which makes Player B more likely to play H, now makes Player A choose 
D, in the Strategic Substitutes game.  
Now consider EH. He will always want to send m0 as he always prefers Player B to 
play D and Player A to play H. Therefore, he must always send m0. As in the 
Strategic Complements case, a ‘constant message’ conveys no information and cheap-
talk is ineffective here too. 
 
The provocative recommender could represent a number of real world phenomena. 
Firstly, agents with extreme agendas sometimes take provocative actions that inflame 
conflicts. Ariel Sharon’s symbolic visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000 
helped spark the Second Intifada and derailed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
(Hefetz and Bloom, 2006). ISI-sponsored militants seem to deliberately inflame the 
conflict between Pakistan and India, partly because India is seen as an enemy, but 
also because the conflict relieves the pressure on extremists supported by the ISI. For 
Pakistani and Indian leaders, a Hawkish stance may be the best response, given the 
(correct) belief that their opponent will become more aggressive. This could include 
ideologues, such as lobby groups or partisan media, signaling intentions of their 
leaders. An example of these is Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was extradited from the 
UK to the US to face terrorism charges, after being charged by British authorities for 
preaching Islamic fundamentalism and militant Islamism. In the USA, Steve Bannon 
has been accused of being a right-wing ideologue wanting to instigate war not only 
with the Islamic State and China but also internally within America, saying to the 
conservative Liberty Restoration Foundation “this is the fourth great crisis in 
American history. We had the Revolution. We had the Civil War. We had the Great 
Depression and World War II. This is the great Fourth Turning in American history”. 
Many of these parties and individuals do actually lie. We isolate the situation where 
they have incentive to lie but they can’t because the information may be verifiable. 
 
A provocative recommender could represent also aggressive bargaining tactics. In 
2000, Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat had to decide whether to adopt a tough stance H 
or a conciliatory stance D in peace negotiations. Furthermore, it might represent 
choosing a Hawkish or Dovish agent who will take aggressive actions on the decision 
maker’s behalf. The median voters in Israel and Palestine decide whether to support 
Likud or Kadima, or Hamas or Fatah, respectively. 
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Our experiments are based on the BS (2012) model but we ran our experiments only 
for the Strategic Complements game.  
 
We ran a first set of experiments (referred to as ‘Experiment 1’) to test whether the 
introduction of a nonbinding, pre-play recommendation causes an increase in play of 
the aggressive strategy. Players did not choose an aggressive strategy with a 
recommendation. There could have been a number of reasons why this occurred 
therefore, we conducted a second set of experiments (referred to as ‘Experiment 2’) 
with modified payoffs. This is described in details Section 3.3. We now briefly 
describe the experiment. 
The experiment consisted of a one-shot stag hunt game, adapted from Baliga and 
Sjostrom (2012) with a discrete number of types. There with two treatments in each 
set of experiments; we refer to them as Treatment 1, 2 in both experiments. 
 
Table 3.1: Treatments of Experiment 1 and 2 
 
  No Recommendation Recommendation 
Experiment 1 (First 
Set of Experiments) 
Treatment 1 x  
Treatment 2  x 
Experiment 2 (Second 
Set of Experiments) 
Treatment 1 x  
Treatment 2  x 
 
Treatment 1 serves as a baseline. Treatment 2 gives the recommendation effect in 
both experiments. 
 
Subjects were only allowed to participate in one treatment and played with an 
anonymous opponent. The sessions did not last more than forty minutes each. There 
were a total of 160 participants, as each treatment included two sessions with 20 
participants in each. Treating each game (pair of participants) as an independent 
observation, this gave 10 independent observations per session and a total of 20 
independent observations per treatment. In Treatments 2, a recommendation was 
announced simultaneously to both players before the players submitted their 
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decisions. Players submitted their decisions simultaneously and then their beliefs 
about their opponent’s behaviour were elicited. The payoff matrices determined their 
payoffs, the outcomes were disclosed and both were paid, privately. 
 
In the experiment, neutral framing was used to describe the two actions, H and D. In 
the Section 3.3 (the ‘Experiment’ section) and thereafter, we refer to them as ‘Option 
X’ and ‘Option Y’, respectively. The model suggests that without a recommendation; 
“dominant strategy Hawk” and “tough moderate” players will play X, whereas 
“dominant strategy Dove” and “weak moderate” players will play Y. When a 
recommendation is made, the model shows that there exists another equilibrium 
where all players will play X, except “dominant strategy Dove” players who choose 
Y. Thus, our first hypothesis is that when the recommendation is not made in 
Treatment 1, we expect more players to choose Y. 
 
We make another hypothesis to verify how supportive our results are of the model. 
Theory states that the reason more players choose X after a recommendation, is 
because “weak moderate” players switch from playing Y to play X. Therefore, for our 
second hypothesis, we check the proportion of “weak moderate” players who play X 
in each treatment, and expect more to play X in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. 
 
We present our analysis in two parts; Part 1 analyses Experiment 1 and Part 2 
analyses Experiment 2. Within each part, we give a descriptive analysis; checking 
whether there are differences in the frequency of X between treatments and formally 
examining whether or not there are significant differences in the observed frequencies 
among treatments by using a non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test. Then, as the 
non-parametric statistical test does not control for other characteristics that may affect 
an individual’s decision, we also use a multivariate regression to address our 
hypotheses. We use a probit model as the dependent variable is binary.  
 
We found that while in some sessions with a recommendation, more players do 
choose an aggressive strategy compared to the treatment without, there is no 
significant difference in the frequency of X among Treatment 1 and Treatment 2; 
participants do not choose X more after a recommendation. This can be for a number 
of reasons, not least because players can be in a babbling equilibrium i.e. they are 
	  	  
88	  
choosing to ignore the messages. It also could be that the symmetric payoffs of the 
Dovish strategy seem like a ‘focal point’ for all but the “dominant strategy” types. 
Further, this behaviour is consistent with players choosing the socially optimal 
outcome or being inequality averse. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the model 
and Section 3.3 describes the experimental design. In Section 3.4, we give our 
hypotheses. In Section 3.5, we give our results and discuss them and, in Section 3.6, 
we conclude. 
 
3.2 Model  
 
3.2.1 Baliga and Sjostrom’s Model Without Cheap-Talk 
 
There are two decision makers, Player A and Player B, who simultaneously choose 
one of two actions, either H or D. 
 
µ is the benefit from being more aggressive than your opponent and d is the cost of 
being caught out when your opponent is aggressive. Player i ∈ {A, B} has a privately 
known cost, ci, of taking action H. This is their type, which is independently drawn 
from the same distribution. 
 
Player i can be one of three types; a “dominant strategy Hawk”, a “dominant strategy 
Dove” or a “Coordination” type (or an “Opportunist” type in the Strategic Substitutes 
game). For a “dominant strategy Hawk”, H is a dominant strategy and for a 
“dominant strategy Dove”, D is a dominant strategy. Player i is a “Coordination type 
if H is a best response to H and D is a best response to D. 
 
A strategy for Player i is a function !i : [!, !] → {H, D} which specifies an action !i(ci) ∈ {H, D} for each cost type ci ∈ [!, !]. Player i uses a cutoff strategy if there is a 
cutoff point x such that  !i(ci) = H if and only if ci < x. In the paper, all Bayesian Nash 
equilibria turn out to be in cutoff strategies and any such strategy can be identified 
with its cutoff point. Using this, the paper shows a unique Communication-Free 
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Equilibrium can be reached via iterated deletion of dominated types. In the Strategic 
Complements game, the fear of “dominant strategy Hawks” causes the 
“Coordination” type who are “almost dominant strategy Hawks” to play H, which 
causes the “almost-almost dominant strategy Hawks” to play H, etc. The cascade 
causes higher and higher types to choose H. 
 
At the other end of the distribution when “dominant strategy Doves” choose D, this 
causes the “Opportunist” type who are “almost dominant strategy Doves” to play D, 
which causes the “almost-almost dominant strategy Doves” to choose D, etc. This 
cascade causes lower and lower types to choose D. 
 
With sufficient uncertainty about the type they may be facing, the two cascades 
resolve the ambiguity about what “moderate” types will do. Thus, in equilibrium, all 
below a certain cost (type) choose H and those above choose D. 
 
3.2.1.1 Parameters 
 
The paper assumes d > 0 and µ > 0 so that Player B’s aggression reduces Player A’s 
payoff.  If it is a Strategic Complements game, then d > µ. This means Player A’s 
incentive to choose H increases with probability that Player B chooses H. If the game 
is one of Strategic Substitutes, then d < µ. This means that Player A’ s incentive to 
choose H decreases with probability that Player B chooses H. 
 
A player is “dominant strategy Hawk” if µ ≥ ci and d ≥ ci, with at least one strict 
inequality. They are a “dominant strategy Dove” if µ ≤ ci and d ≤ ci, with at least one 
strict inequality. In the Strategic Complements game, they are a “Coordination” type 
if µ ≤ ci ≤ d, so action H’s best response is H and action D’s best response is D. They 
are an “almost dominant strategy Hawk” if their cost is slightly above µ. The player is 
an “Opportunist” Type if d ≤ ci ≤ µ, so action D’s best response is H and action H’s 
best response is D. They are an “almost dominant strategy Dove” if their cost is 
slightly below d. 
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Without cheap-talk, the unique Bayesian Nash Communication-Free Equilibrium is 
where Player i chooses H if ci ≤ x, where x is the “cut-off” cost. If ci is above x, 
Player i will choose D.   
 
3.2.2 Baliga and Sjostrom’s Model With Cheap-Talk 
 
To model the effects of communication, a third player, Player E, is introduced. Player 
E’s payoff function is such that they are either known “dominant strategy Hawks” 
(denoted by EH) or “dominant strategy Doves” (ED).  The model assumes cE is 
common knowledge among all three players, cA is known by Player A and Player E, 
whereas cB is only known by Player B. 
 
The paper gives two possibilities. In the first case, EH wants Player A to choose H, 
and in the second case, ED wants Player A to choose D. In both cases, Player E always 
wants Player B to choose D. 
 
In the model, the time line is as follows. ci, i ∈ {A, B} is determined. Player A and 
Player E learn cA, and Player B learns cB. Then, Player E sends a publicly observed 
cheap-talk message, m ∈ M, where M is his message space. Finally, Player A and B 
simultaneously choose H or D. 
 
Note: we can of course have a “babbling equilibrium” where the players ignore the 
message and play the unique Communication-Free Equilibrium. A Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium with effective cheap-talk is called a Communication Equilibrium. Cheap-
talk is only effective if a positive measure of types choose different actions after the 
message, than they would have done in Communication-Free Equilibrium. In order 
for this to happen, Player E must reveal some information about A’s type. 
 
A strategy for Player E is a function m : [!, !] → M where m(cA) is the message sent 
by Player E when Player A’s type is cA. The BS paper shows how, without loss of 
generality, each player uses a “conditional” cutoff strategy. For any message m, there 
is a cutoff cB(m) such that if Player B hears message m, he chooses H (if and only if 
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cB ≤ cB(m)). Therefore, without loss of generality, they can assume that M contains 
only two messages, M = {m0, m1}. 
 
3.2.2.1 Strategic Complements 
 
When E is EH, a Communication Equilibrium exists. 
 
If E is EH, he knows m1 will make Player A more likely to play H as it makes Player 
B play H. This happens even though Player E always prefers Player B to choose D. 
 
Player B is more likely to choose H after m1 than after m0 as m1 conveys information 
about A’s type to B and makes him more likely to play H as m1 comes only if A 
comes from a range that does not contain the “dominant strategy Doves”. If Player 
A’s action doesn’t depend on the message, then E prefers sending m0. If Player A’s 
action does depend on the message, then A must be “Coordination” type who plays H 
when sent m1 (because provocation makes Player B choose H) and D when sent m0 
(because Player B is less likely to choose H). 
 
Since all types want their opponent to choose D, they are all harmed by the third 
party’s cheap-talk. Eliminating EH makes everyone strictly better off. 
 
If E is ED then he wants both to choose D, so he must always send m0 in equilibrium. 
However, a constant message is not informative and the cheap-talk is ineffective. 
 
3.2.2.2 Parameters 
 
In order for the game to be Strategic Complements, ! < µ < d < !. If E is of cost type, 
cE < 0, then they are EH. This is because they enjoy a benefit (- cE) > 0 if Player A is 
aggressive and chooses H. At most, they get 0 if Player A chooses D. Thus, EH wants 
Player A to play H. 
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If cE > µ + d, then Player E is ED. They get no more than µ - cE if Player A chooses H, 
and they get no less than – d > µ - cE if Player A chooses D. Thus, ED wants Player A 
to play D. Both EH and ED always want Player B to choose D, so µ > 0 and d > 0. 
 
3.2.2.3 Strategic Substitutes  
 
In this section, we briefly consider the game of Strategic Substitutes where ! < d < µ 
< !.  
 
If E is ED, a Communication Equilibrium exists. Since m1 makes Player B more 
Hawkish, (cB(m1) > cB(m0), then by Strategic Substitutes, it makes Player A more 
Dovish, (cA(m1) < cA(m0). 
 
ED will send m1 if and only if Player A is an “Opportunist” who will be induced by 
m1 to switch to D. The model shows how by making it more likely that Player B will 
play H (unless they are a “dominant strategy Dove”), Player A anticipating this will 
play D. 
 
EH always wants Player A to choose H so they will always send m0 and cheap-talk is 
ineffective. 
 
3.3 Experiment 
 
In the experiment, neutral framing was used to describe the two actions, H and D. 
From hereafter, we refer to them as ‘Option X’ and ‘Option Y’, respectively. We also 
use neutral framing to describe the types, as explained in the following paragraph. 
 
The game is adapted from BS (2012) with a discrete number of types. There are four 
types with Type i having cost ci. There are “dominant strategy Hawks” (Type A, with 
costs cA), “dominant strategy Doves” (Type D, with costs cD) and two “moderate” 
types with differing costs. The “moderate” types could be a “tough moderate” type 
(Type B, with costs cB) or a “weak moderate” (Type C, with costs cC) type, and may 
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play X or Y, depending on their beliefs about the strategies about other types. X or Y 
is a dominant strategy for the “dominant strategy” Hawks or Doves. 
 
‘Experimenter demand effects’ (Zizzo, 2010) are changes in behaviour by 
experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes appropriate behaviour. They 
are a potential problem when they are positively correlated with the true experimental 
objectives’ predictions. In our experiment, our neutral framework avoids this. We 
only adopt neutral language and don’t use words such as ‘opponent’ or ‘partner’, nor 
words such as ‘conflict’ in our design. 
 
Two sets of experiments were run and each set had two treatments; one with and one 
without a recommendation.  The two sets differed somewhat in the payoffs but both 
were games with Strategic Complements. We call them Experiment 1 (with 
Treatment 1 and 2) and Experiment 2 (with Treatment 1 and 2), respectively.  
 
In the experiment, by construction we have ruled out any incentive for the 
recommender to lie. The third party is a computer who plays the role of a provocateur. 
If they were to lie, they would just be behaving as a pacifist and the BS theory 
predicts that this would have no effect on a Strategic Complements game. The 
provocateur wants Player A to choose X and Player B to choose Y. If Player A’s 
action doesn’t depend on the message, then E prefers sending m0 (increasing the 
likelihood of Player B choosing Y). If Player A’s action does depend on the message, 
then A must be “Coordination” type who plays H when sent m1 (because provocation 
makes Player B choose H) and D when sent m0 (because Player B is less likely to 
choose H). 
 
3.3.1 Parameters 
 
Experiment 1: Treatment 1 and 2 
We have set cA equal to 4.5 for the “dominant strategy Hawk” types, cB is 5 for 
“tough moderate” types, cC is 6 for “weak moderate” types and cD is 6.5 for 
“dominant strategy Dove” types. The disutility of being less advantaged, d, is 6 and 
the gain of being more advantaged,  !, is 5.  
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The probability of being an aggressive “dominant strategy Hawk” type is 0.1, the 
probability of being either “moderate” type is 0.4 and the probability of being a 
peaceful “dominant strategy Dove” type is 0.1 across both treatments. This 
approximates the BS  (2012) environment where the number of dominant types is a 
small fraction of the total population. 
 
 
X Y 
 
X 
 
 
−ci 
 
5−ci 
 
Y 
 
 
-6 
 
0 
 
Figure 3.2: Payoff matrix of Player i in Experiment 1 with values of d and ! inserted 
 
Experiment 2: Treatment 1 and 2 
We modified the payoffs in the second set of experiments. We kept cA equal to 4.5 for 
the “dominant strategy Hawk” types, but set cB as 5.5 for “tough moderate” types, cC 
as 6.5 for “weak moderate” types and cD as 7.5 for “dominant strategy Dove” 
types.  !  was kept as 5 but the disutility of being less advantaged, d, was changed to 7. 
This was to increase the loss in payoffs from playing Y when the opponent plays X.  
 
We changed the probabilities of the types. The probability of being either “dominant 
strategy” types became 0.2 and the probability of being either “moderate” type was 
set to 0.3. The higher probability of facing a “dominant strategy” type made each 
“moderate” type ‘safer’ in aligning with the type closest to them.  
 
Treatments 2 included a recommendation. This is explained in more detail in the 
next section. 
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3.3.2 Experimental Design  
 
The design consists of a one-shot game with two treatment conditions in each 
experiment (See Table 3.1). In Treatment 1, there is no recommendation, whereas in 
Treatment 2, there is. Treatment 1 served as a baseline and Treatment 2 gave the 
effect of a recommendation. Before playing, each subject in a pair was given a 
recommendation in Treatments 2, which could be either X or Y. Following a 
recommendation was not binding. The recommendation mimicked what the 
Recommender in BS (2012) would have suggested to each type. 
 
Subjects were only allowed to participate in one session (between-subjects design) 
and, therefore, only one treatment, with an anonymous opponent. We chose to 
conduct separate subjects per treatment, to rule out any dependence on what happened 
in the previous treatment. There were a total of 160 participants, as each treatment 
included two sessions with 20 participants in each. Treating each game as an 
independent observation, this gave 10 independent observations per session and a 
total of 20 independent observations per treatment. 
 
With a prior probability (see Section 3.3.1), the subjects were assigned a type; Type A 
(the “dominant strategy Hawk” type in the model), Type B (the “tough moderate” 
type), Type C (the “weak moderate” type) and Type D (the “dominant strategy Dove” 
type). They were told their possible payoffs from each action, which depended on 
what their opponent played. The payoff structure of the game, including the 
percentage of types in the experiment, was known. However, the type of each player 
was private information. Thus, the players knew their own type but not the other 
player’s type. The distribution of types was drawn from a computer programmed with 
a probability of being either one of the four. 
 
In order to avoid the participants facing negative outcomes, the payoffs were scaled 
up by 9.5 points in Experiment 1 and 8.5 points in Experiment 2, to ensure positive 
payoffs. 
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X Y 
 
X 
 
 
9.5-ci   
 
14.5 – ci  
 
Y 
 
 
3.5  
 
9.5 
 
Figure 3.3: Payoff matrix for Player i within Experiment 1 when scaled 
 
As in our previous chapter, firstly, players were given instructions5 and asked to 
complete a quiz to make sure they had understood the information given. An 
experimenter read the instructions aloud and the experiment only began once all of 
the participants had answered the quiz’s questions correctly. Then, they were assigned 
their type. 
 
In the next stage, players were matched in groups of two. As the players’ payoffs 
differed depending on what type they were exogenously assigned, we provided a 
number of payoff matrices to show all of the possible outcomes for the participants 
from facing each type. The sets of payoff matrices are shown in Figure 3.4, Figure 
3.5, Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7. We have provided the screenshots from the 
experiment6. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Full	  instructions	  are	  included	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  6	  Payoff	  matrices	  for	  Experiment	  1	  and	  Experiment	  2	  are	  included	  in	  the	  Appendix.	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Figure 3.4: Payoff matrices for Type A players as it appeared in Experiment 1 
(Treatment 1) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Payoff matrices for Type B players as it appeared in Experiment 1 
(Treatment 1) 
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Figure 3.6: Payoff matrices for Type C players as it appeared in Experiment 1 
(Treatment 1) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Payoff matrices for Type D players as it appeared in Experiment 1 
(Treatment 1) 
 
In Treatment 2, a recommendation was publicly announced within each group (on-
screen) simultaneously for 60 seconds, before participants submitted their decisions 
simultaneously. They were told that the recommendation was made by a 
Recommender, who knew the type of one participant in their group and who made the 
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recommendation based on this knowledge. They were informed of whether the 
Recommender knew their type or the other participant’s type. They were also told 
what the recommendations meant. i.e. if the Recommender knew the type was B or C, 
the recommendation to choose Option X made, whereas, if the Recommender knew 
the type was A or D, the recommendation to choose Option Y was made. They were 
reminded that they did not have to choose the option that had been recommended to 
them. 
 
After this, beliefs about their opponent’s behaviour were elicited. They were asked to 
indicate which option (X or Y) they thought each type they could be matched with, 
will choose. If they correctly estimated the actual choice made by their opponent, they 
received £2, thus there were incentives for correct elicitation of beliefs. 
 
At the end of the game, the outcomes were disclosed to each person and everyone was 
paid privately. The final screen reported their type and their choice, their opponent’s 
type and their choice, the total points they earned, the total points they earned in 
pounds, their earnings from the belief elicitation, their £2.50 show up fee, plus their 
corresponding final pound payment. Before they left the laboratory, participants were 
asked to complete a short questionnaire7 providing information such as their gender 
and how clearly they thought the instructions had been. 
 
3.3.3 Experimental Procedures 
 
The experiment was programmed with z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and all 
subjects were recruited at the University of Birmingham, using ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2015). The experiment was conducted at the Birmingham Experimental 
Economics Laboratory. In total, 160 subjects participated in the experiment with 40 
subjects per treatment. We ran two sessions per treatment, therefore, there were 20 
subjects in each session. At the end of each session, subjects were privately paid 
according to their total amount of experimental currency units (ECUs), using an 
exchange rate of £1 per ECU. Average earnings (excluding a show- up fee of £2.50) 
were £8.37. Sessions lasted 40 minutes, on average.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  the	  questionnaire,	  see	  2.12	  Appendix	  E.	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3.4 Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we formally present our theoretical hypothesis. The model shows that 
without a recommendation; Type A and Type B players will play X, whereas Type C 
and Type D players will play Y. When a recommendation is made, the model shows 
that there exists another equilibrium where all players will play X, except Type D 
players who choose Y. This occurs as the Recommender conveys information by 
saying ‘choose X’ when the player whose type is known is not a “dominant strategy” 
type. As a result, the other player is aware that the ‘firewall’ of a “dominant strategy 
Dove” is not there and this may cause a switch in her moving from Y to X, however, 
that may also cause the other player to move from Y to X. Thus, when the 
recommendation is not made in Treatment 1, we expect more players to choose Y. 
 
Table 3.2: The choices types will make, based on the model 
 
 Treatment 
T1 (N=40) T2 (N=40) 
 
Type 
 
A, B à X 
C, D à Y 
 
 
A, B, C à X 
Dà Y 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Null Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X in Treatment 2 is at least the frequency of X in Treatment 1. 
Alternate Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X is lesser in Treatment 2 compared to Treatment 1. 
 
In order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be lesser in Treatment 2 than in 
Treatment 1. 
 
More specifically, we have another hypothesis to verify how supportive our results 
are of the model. BS (2012) show that more players choose X because Type C players 
switch from playing Y, without recommendation, in Treatment 1 to playing X in 
	  	  
101	  
Treatment 2. Therefore, we can check the proportion of Type C players who play X in 
each Treatment. 
  
Hypothesis 2 
Null Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X within Type C players in Treatment 2 is at most the frequency of X 
in Treatment 1. 
Alternate Hypothesis: 
The frequency of X within Type C players is greater in Treatment 2 compared to 
Treatment 1. 
 
In order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be greater in Treatment 2 than in 
Treatment 1.  
 
We now give each experiment’s results and interpret the findings. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
We present our analysis in two parts; Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. We analyse the 
data from both sets of experiments within each part. In both Experiments 1 and 2, we 
compare Treatments 1 and 2. We test the hypotheses by first giving a descriptive 
analysis; checking whether there are differences in the frequency of X between 
treatments and formally examining whether or not there are statistically significant 
differences in the observed frequencies among treatments by using a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon ranksum test. We also test for the Equality of Proportions. Then, we use 
multivariate probit regressions to see if the differences hold after we include a host of 
control variables which are likely to affect the dependent variable we consider. 
 
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
Based on the model by Baliga and Sjostrom, we can predict that the recommendation 
will affect whether all types prefer to play X. The paper states that without 
communication, in equilibrium, all below a certain cost (type) choose X and those 
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above choose Y. In our experiment, we ensured that the “tough moderate” type (Type 
B) plays X and the “weak moderate” type (Type C) plays Y, whilst the remaining 
types follow their dominant strategy. 
 
BS show that with communication, if a recommendation is made by a EH type Player 
E, there is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the Strategic Complements game. 
In this equilibrium, only Types A, B and C choose X. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we consider the frequency of X within the two treatments as 
Treatment 1 is the baseline and Treatment 2 shows the effect of a recommendation. In 
order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be greater in Treatment 2 than in 
Treatment 1. 
 
3.5.1.1 Experiment 1 
 
We look at the observed frequencies of how often the individual’s chose X. Each 
treatment consisted of 80 subjects. Our data shows that there is an increase of three 
participants choosing X when the recommendation was made. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Frequency of X in Experiment 
1 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Frequency of X and Y in 
Experiment 1 
 
We can also look at the proportion of X within the individual observations (pairs). An 
individual observation consists of a group of two subjects. We measure the proportion 
of X by showing the percentage of each group that chose X; so if both members chose 
X, the group is assigned 100. The frequency of the outcome (X,X), the number of 
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groups in which both subjects chose X, increased from no groups (out of 20) to one 
group. The frequency of the outcome (Y,Y) decreased from 11 individual 
observations to 10.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Proportion of X for each individual observation in Experiment 1 
 
Figure 3.10 shows a scatter graph of every individual observation in both treatments. 
Observations 1 to 10 are from the first session and observations 11 to 20 are from the 
second. The stacked bar chart in Figure 3.11 depicts the lower number of (Y,Y) 
observations, more clearly. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Proportion of X within 
individual observations in Experiment 1 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Mean proportion of X 
within individual observations in 
Experiment 1 
 
Considering the proportion of X in each pair, we present the means of Treatment 1 
and 2 for our individual observations, in the table below. 
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Table 3.3: Mean proportion of X within individual observations in Experiment 1 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Mean 22.5 27.5 
 
 
If all participants chose X, the mean would be 100. From Table 3.3, we observe that 
the mean proportion of pairs choosing X is 22.5 in Treatment 1, and 27.5 in 
Treatment 2. Therefore, Treatment 2 has a mean that is 22% higher, supporting our 
hypothesis. This indicates that there are differences in the frequency of X between 
treatments. 
 
We formally examined whether the differences in the observed frequencies in our 
treatments are statistically significant, by using a non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum 
test, and report the corresponding p-values from the test performed for a pairwise 
comparison. It tests the hypothesis that two independent samples (that is, unmatched 
data) are from populations with the same distribution. The p-value for differences in 
choosing X between Treatments 1 and 2 was 0.6538. This is statistically insignificant 
and we cannot reject that the two populations have similar distributions. 
 
We also conduct a test for the equality of proportions. This tests whether one 
population’s proportion equals another population’s proportion. It tests the equality of 
two proportions against the alternative that they are not equal. The z-value is -0.52, 
which means we reject the null and the proportions are not different. 
 
We ran a series of regressions with the data from our first set of experiments but all of 
these were statistically insignificant too. The results of these regressions are presented 
in the Table 3.4. 
 
For the regression, the dependent variable Choice is binary; it can have only two 
possible outcomes, which we will denote as 1 and 0. Choice takes a value of 1 if the 
individual chose X and a value of 0 if the individual chose Y.  
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In our first regression, we include the following independent variables: 
1. Treatment2: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the data belongs to the 
second treatment. 
2. Type: that takes a value of 1 if the individual is of Type A, a value of 2 if the 
individual is of Type B, a value of 3 if the individual is of Type C and a value 
of 4 if the individual is of Type D. 
3. Understanding: a binary variable that takes value 1 when their belief 
elicitation showed they had understood the model. In Treatment 1, if they 
correctly identified the strategies for all types, we say they have an 
understanding. In Treatment 2, if they thought Type As and Type Bs would 
choose X and Type Ds were likely to play Y, we say they had an 
understanding. We accepted either X or Y for Type C. 
4. Gender: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant is female. 
5. Economics: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant has 
studied Economics previously, and may therefore be familiar with game 
theory. 
6. Religion: a binary variable that takes value 1 when the participant reports to 
have any religious inclination. 
7. Instructions: that takes a value of 0 if the individual found the instructions 
‘Very Unclear’, a value of 1 if the individual found them ‘Unclear’, a value of 
2 if the individual found them ‘Neutral’, a value of 3 if the individual found 
them ‘Clear’ and a value of 4 if they found the instructions ‘Very Clear’. No 
participants in this experiment reported that they had found the instructions 
‘Unclear’ or ‘Very Unclear’. 
 
We have 20 observations from each treatment, giving a total of 80 overall. We present 
the coefficients for these variables from the probit regression with robust standard 
errors clustered on independent matching groups.  
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Table 3.4: Probit regression results for Experiment 1 
 
No. of Obs.: 80; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment2 
0.17 
(0.34) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
Type 
-0.90*** 
(0.25) 
-0.86*** 
(0.25) 
-1.00*** 
(0.27) 
-0.98*** 
(0.28) 
Understanding   
0.61* 
(0.35)   
0.59 
(0.36) 
Gender     
0.16 
(0.39) 
0.07 
(0.40) 
Econ     
0.52 
(0.35) 
0.48 
(0.36) 
Religion     
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.23 
(0.39) 
Instructions     
0.32 
(0.27) 
0.36 
(0.28) 
Constant 
1.32** 
(0.59) 
1.03* 
(0.61) 
0.33 
(0.89) 
-0.02 
(0.93) 
  
Pseudo R2: 
0.1875 
Pseudo R2: 
0.2212 
Pseudo R2: 
0.2308 
Pseudo R2: 
0.2603 
 
There are limited ways in which we can interpret the individual regression 
coefficients. A positive coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to an 
increase in the predicted probability. We use the probability the z test statistic would 
be observed under the null hypothesis that a particular predictor’s regression 
coefficient is zero, given that the rest of the predictors are in the model. For a given 
alpha level, it determines whether or not the null hypothesis can be rejected. If it is 
less than alpha, then the null hypothesis can be rejected and the parameter estimate is 
considered statistically significant at that alpha level. We use, following standard 
notations, * to denote statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and 
*** at the 1% level. 
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Type has a negative coefficient and is significant at a 1% level, showing us that Type 
As were the most likely to choose X and Type D’s were the least likely, as we 
expected. Understanding is significant at a 10% level. This means that the more 
participants seemed to understand the experiment, the more likely they were to play 
X. While the frequency of X shows more players do seem to choose an aggressive 
strategy with a recommendation compared to the treatment without, the Treatment2 
variable shows the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels of 
significance. The regression analysis confirms our previous results. This may occur 
for a variety of reasons. Players may simply be playing a ‘babbling’ equilibrium and 
ignoring recommendations. It is also possible that the payoff pair (9.5, 9.5) from the 
non-aggressive strategy may be appearing focal and may look like a ‘safe strategy’ 
with implicit co-ordination between players. 
 
We also run regressions using interactive terms. Most interactive terms showed no 
additional significance of other variables. By interacting Econ and Instructions, we 
get a statistically significant (at a 10% significant level) result with a positive 
coefficient. Also, interacting Religion and Money (how important a participant 
thought earning money within the experiment was), Econ became significant at 10% 
level.  
 
We conducted a second set of experiments, whose results we will now give in Section 
3.5.1.2. In these experiments, we modified to the payoffs to reduce the likelihood of 
implicit coordination by making it more costly for them to play Y if there is chance 
that the other player will play X. Thus, in Experiment 2, a player was penalized 
greater for playing Y more, when their opponent chooses X. Additionally, by 
increasing the probability of “dominant strategy” types it provided a better ‘pull’ for 
Types C and D to play X and Y, thus creating a bigger incentive to deviate when the 
Recommender signals that the opponent is not a “dominant strategy Dove”. 
 
3.5.1.2 Experiment 2 
 
We look at the observed frequencies of how often the individuals chose X. Both 
treatments also consisted of 80 subjects and there is an increase of four participants 
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choosing X when the recommendation was made, in comparison to three in the 
Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Frequency of X in 
Experiment 2 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Frequency of X and Y in 
Experiment 2 
The frequency of the outcome (X,X), the number of groups in which both subjects 
chose X, increased from one group (out of 20) to two groups. The frequency of the 
outcome (Y,Y) decreased from 10 individual observations to 7. These results support 
our first hypothesis slightly more than those from Experiment 1, where there was a 
decrease of one group. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15: Proportion of X for each individual observation in Experiment 2 
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Figure 3.16: Proportion of X within 
individual observations in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Mean proportion of X 
within individual observations in 
Experiment 2 
 
In Figure 3.15, Observations 1 to 10 are from the first session and Observations 11 to 
20 are from the second session. Figure 3.16 shows more of a decline in the frequency 
of the outcome (Y,Y) than in Experiment 1, indicating that Experiment 2 may have 
results that better fit the hypothesis. The difference in the mean proportions of 
choosing X with the pairs doubled from the previous experiment, from a difference of 
5% within an observation to a difference of 10%. 
 
Table 3.5: Mean proportion of X within individual observations in Experiment 2 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Mean 27.5 37.5 
 
Despite the data looking more promising, the p-value from the Wilcoxon ranksum test 
was 0.3105 and, therefore, still statistically insignificant. We cannot reject the null 
and both treatments do not have similar distributions. The z-value from the test for the 
equality of proportions is -0.95, which means we reject the null and the proportions 
are not different either. 
 
The results from conducting the probit regressions are shown in Table 3.6. As in 
Experiment 1, Type and Understanding are significant. The Religion variable is 
significant here. The negative coefficient suggests participants in this experiment who 
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did not identify themselves with a religion, behaved less aggressively. Instructions is 
statistically significant and has a negative coefficient too, suggesting those 
participants who understood played less aggressively too. Including interactive terms 
did not make any other variables significant. 
 
Table 3.6: Probit regression results for Experiment 2 
 
 No. of Obs.: 80; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment2 
0.30 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
-0.14 
(0.37) 
Type 
-0.37** 
(0.16) 
-0.35** 
(0.17) 
-0.40** 
(0.17) 
-0.36* 
(0.19) 
Understanding   
1.22*** 
(0.36)   
1.15*** 
(0.40) 
Gender     
-0.59 
(0.38) 
-0.36 
(0.40) 
Econ     
0.21 
(0.33) 
0.18 
(0.35) 
Religion     
-0.84** 
(0.34) 
-0.60 
(0.37) 
Instructions     
-0.62** 
(0.28) 
-0.68** 
(0.30) 
Constant 
0.27 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(0.46) 
2.55** 
(1.01) 
2.23** 
(1.05) 
  
Pseudo R2:  
0.0677 
Pseudo R2:  
0.1899 
Pseudo R2:  
0.1800 
Pseudo R2:  
0.2682 
 
Result 1 There is no significant difference in the frequency of X between Treatment 1 
and Treatment 2; participants do not choose X more or less when a recommendation 
is made by a provocateur. 
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3.5.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
Beyond Hypothesis 1, we can make another, more specific, hypothesis regarding 
Type C players. The theory states that without communication, in equilibrium, the 
“weak moderate” type will play Y. This is due to a cascade in the Strategic 
Complements game, whereby the “dominant strategy Doves” playing Y causes the 
“almost dominant strategy Doves” to choose Y, causing lower and lower types to 
choose Y. In our experiment, we ensured that the “weak moderate” type was above a 
cutoff cost, which meant that in the model, they would play Y in the Communication-
Free Equilibrium. 
 
BS show that with communication, if a recommendation is made by a EH type Player 
E, in the unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the Strategic Complements game, then 
Type C players switch from playing Y to playing X. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we consider the frequency of X within Type C players for the 
two treatments. Once again, Treatment 1 is the baseline and Treatment 2 shows the 
effect of a recommendation. In order to reject the null, the frequency of X must be 
greater in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. 
 
3.5.2.1 Experiment 1 
 
We check the frequency of X within Type C participants, as well as the frequency of 
X within the individual observations (matched pairs) that include Type C participants. 
In Figure 3.18, the number of Type Cs choosing X falls from 2 participants to 1, 
unlike what theory states. The frequency of X within the individual observations 
remained the same for the (Y,Y) outcome, at 9 groups. In this experiment, it does not 
seem that our data supports BS’ model. 
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Figure 3.18: The frequency of X and Y for 
Type C participants in Experiment 1 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Proportion of X within 
individual observations that include 
Type C participants in Experiment 1 
 
The mean proportions of X within the individual observations that included Type C 
participants are shown in Table 3.7. Although there is a 3.1 increase in the mean, the 
Wilcoxon ranksum test’s p-value of 0.5506 shows that the difference in the 
distributions is statistically insignificant. We also conducted a Wilcoxon ranksum test 
using Type C players alone, rather than the individual observations that included Type 
C players. This reported a p-value of 1.0000, which is also statistically insignificant. 
The z-value of the test for the equality of proportions is -0.36 for data with only Type 
C players and 1.47 for data including the pairs. In both tests, we reject the null so the 
proportions are not different too. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
recommendation is making Type C participants play X less frequently either. 
 
Table 3.7: Mean proportion of X within individual observations that include Type 3 
participants in Experiment 1 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Mean 21.9 25 
 
We conducted a series of probit regressions with the data only including Type C 
players; however, none of the variables appeared statistically significant. We ran a 
further set of regressions using the individual observations that included Type C 
players, and the results are given in the following table where Type and 
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Understanding are statistically significant. Including interactive terms did not make 
any other variables significant. 
 
Table 3.8: Probit regressions for Experiment 1 using only individual observations that 
include Type C players 
 
No. of Obs.: 64; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment2 
0.09 
(0.37) 
0.04 
(0.38) 
0.12 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(0.39) 
Type 
-0.81*** 
(0.26) 
-0.76*** 
(0.27) 
-0.90*** 
(0.29) 
-0.82*** 
(0.30) 
Understanding   
0.63* 
(0.38)   
0.58 
(0.40) 
Gender     
0.70 
(0.43) 
-0.05 
(0.44) 
Econ     
0.32 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
Religion     
-0.03 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
Instructions     
0.31 
(0.32) 
0.28 
(0.32) 
Constant 
1.05* 
(0.64) 
0.72 
(0.67) 
0.31 
(1.02) 
0.09 
(1.06) 
  
Pseudo R2:  
0.1473 
Pseudo R2:  
0.1866 
Pseudo R2:  
0.1714 
Pseudo R2:  
0.2008 
 
3.5.2.2 Experiment 2 
 
The frequency of X within Type C participants increased in Experiment 2; it doubled 
from 3 participants to 6. This is a greater change from the results we found in 
Experiment 1. The proportion of X within the individual observations that included 
Type C participants also depicts this reduction in the (Y,Y) outcome. 
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Figure 3.20: The frequency of X and Y 
for Type C participants in Experiment 2 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Proportion of X within 
individual observations that include Type 
C participants in Experiment 2 
 
The mean proportion of X within the individual observations that include Type C 
participants is shown in Table 3.9. This increase in 15 is greater than the 3.1 increase 
in Experiment 1. The difference can be seen more clearly when comparing Figure 
3.22 and 3.23. 
 
Table 3.9: Mean proportion of X within individual observations that include Type 3 
participants in Experiment 2 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Mean 25 40 
 
 
 
Figure 3.22: Mean proportion of X within 
individual observations that include Type 
3 participants in Experiment 1 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Mean proportion of X within 
individual observations that include Type 
3 participants in Experiment 2 
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The Wilcoxon ranksum test’s p-value of 0.2594 showed that the difference in the 
distributions is statistically insignificant. The z-value of the test for the equality of 
proportions is -1.82 and we reject the null again. Using Type C players alone, it 
reported a p-value of 0.6602, which is also statistically insignificant, however, the z 
value from the test for equality of proportions in -3.54. Here, we cannot reject the null 
so the proportions are different. 
 
Table 3.10: Probit regressions for Experiment 2 using only individual observations 
that include Type C players 
 
No. of Obs.: 40; Dependent variable: Choice =1 if X and =0 ow. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment2 
0.42 
(0.42) 
0.50 
(0.43) 
-0.09 
(0.52) 
-0.04 
(0.53) 
Type 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
-0.14 
(0.30) 
-0.08 
(0.32) 
Understanding   
0.89 
(0.57)   
0.46 
(0.66) 
Gender     
-1.61** 
(0.66) 
-1.50** 
(0.67) 
Econ     
0.23 
(0.49) 
0.21  
0.50) 
Religion     
-0.39 
(0.56) 
-0.33 
(0.56) 
Instructions     
-1.45** 
(0.59) 
-1.40** 
(0.60) 
Constant 
-0.49 
(0.66) 
-1.03 
(0.78) 
4.61** 
(2.32) 
4.14* 
(2.42) 
  
Pseudo 
R2: 
0.0224 
Pseudo 
R2: 
0.0715 
Pseudo R2: 
0.2677 
Pseudo R2: 
0.2773 
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Conducting probit regressions with the data only including Type C players, also 
showed no variables were statistically significant. When running regressions using the 
individual observations that included Type C players, the Instructions variable was 
statistically significant. Gender also became significant, suggesting that females were 
more likely to play Y. The results of these regressions are given in Table 3.10. 
 
We also conduct a regression of Model 1 with a belief variable. This is a binary 
variable that takes value 1 when the participant believed their opponent would play X. 
When participants elicited their beliefs, we checked if they thought the type that they 
were actually matched with, would play X. Belief was statistically significant at a 1% 
level with a positive coefficient, which means if a participant believed their opponent 
was playing X, they were more likely to play X too. 
 
We run regressions using interactive terms. Interacting Religion and Money (how 
important a participant thought earning money within the experiment was) made 
several variables statistically significant. Gender, Religion, Instructions and Money 
became statistically significant at a 5% level with negative coefficients. Money 
suggests that if participants cared about earning money, they were more likely to play 
Y, supporting the possibility that the outcome for (Y,Y) may have appeared focal and 
“safe”. 
 
Result 2 There is no significant difference in the frequency of X within Type C 
players, between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 across both experiments. Type C 
participants do not choose X more or less when a recommendation is made by a 
provocateur. 
 
3.5.3 The Recommender’s Knowledge (Treatment 2 in Experiment 2 only) 
 
As the frequency of X within Type C participants increased in Experiment 2, we 
looked at the data for which Type C players received recommendations on the 
knowledge of their type and compared them to those who received recommendations 
based on their opponent’s type. This could enable us to gain a deeper insight into the 
decisions made by the participants. The data showed that, overall, participants did 
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seem to follow the recommendation. When given a recommendation based on their 
type (and they were recommended to choose Option X), four followed and two did 
not. When the recommendation was not based on their type, if they were 
recommended X then 50% followed (2 out of 4) and if they were recommended Y 
then 100% followed (2 out of 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.24: The frequency of X and Y for 
Type C individuals by Recommender’s 
knowledge 
 
 
 
Figure 3.25: The proportion of X within 
individual observations that include 
Type C participants by Recommender’s 
knowledge 
 
Furthermore, the frequency of the outcome (Y,Y) became 0 when the 
recommendation was based on the Type C participant’s type. The Wilcoxon ranksum 
test still reported a statistically insignificant p-value of 0.3515, as did the test when 
using data solely from Type C players (p-value of 0.1380). The results of the test for 
equality of proportions was significant for both sets of data (z value is -5.96 for pairs 
and 5.66 for individuals) and we cannot reject the null so the proportions are different. 
However, the change is sign suggests these results may be unreliable. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
We conducted a set of experiments based on BS (2012). We wanted to see if a 
Recommender could cause a change in behaviour of players. In particular, we wanted 
to see if that could cause a change from a ‘peaceful’ strategy to an ‘aggressive’ 
strategy. Our experiments do not support the hypotheses that players play more 
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aggressively with the recommendation. However, for the Experiment 2, when we 
conduct an ‘equality of proportions’ test, we do find a higher portion of Type C 
players switching from Y to X. The fact that recommendations do not cause a change 
is of course perfectly consistent with theory, as even with a recommendation, there 
exist a ‘babbling’ equilibrium where all players ignore the recommendation. Further, 
at least for Experiment 1, the payoff differential from playing Y (rather than X) when 
the opponent plays X is not great and the payoffs from playing (Y,Y) look attractive 
for all but the “dominant strategy Hawk” type. Even when the payoff differential is 
increased, the change across the two treatments is statistically insignificant. There 
could be several reasons for this, players may be behaving in a way consistent with 
maximizing sum of payoffs (Englemann and Strobel, 2004), they may be inequity 
averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or they may have (pro-)social preferences 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986).  
 
Maximising their sum of payoffs is choosing the outcome that gives the highest total 
payoff between both players. The sum of both players’ payoffs from YY is always 19 
ECU and this is greater than the sum of any other combination of actions, for every 
type. For example, if a Type A plays X and their opponent (who is also a Type A) 
plays Y, then the sum of their payoffs is only 13.5 ECU. Inequity aversion is the 
disutility arising from differences between one’s own payoff and others’ payoffs. 
Unless your partner is of the same type and plays the same action, YY is the fairest 
outcome with the least difference (0 because 9.5-9.5=0) between the players’ payoffs, 
regardless of which types are in your group. (Pro- )social preferences is voluntary 
behaviour intended to benefit another, possibly motivated by empathy - the concern 
about the welfare and rights of others - or adherence to one's perceived system of 
fairness. Unless their partner is a Type A participant, the outcome for YY always 
yields the highest payoff (9.5) for their partner. Even for Type A participants, the 
highest payoff they can receive is only 0.5 ECU greater at 10 ECU. 
 
While one would not like to draw wide reaching general conclusions from this, this 
experiment suggests that ‘provocation’ may not always be successful and if the gains 
from not engaging in conflict is sufficient, it may be stable enough to withstand 
provocation. 	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3.7 Appendix A 
 
Instructions without Communication (Experiment 1) 	  
Preliminary Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory. This is an 
experiment in the economics of decision-making. The funding for this research has 
been provided by various research foundations. Just for showing up, you have already 
earned a show up fee of £2.50. You can earn additional money depending on the 
decisions made by you and other participants. It is very important that you read the 
instructions carefully. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of 
these rules. 
We will first go over the instructions together. After we have read the instructions, 
you will have time to ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any 
decisions you make in this experiment are completely anonymous. Please do not 
touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
The experiment consists of one round. You will be paid according to the number of 
points you have collected in that round with the following exchange rate: 
1 point = £1 
You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
Type and Matching 
In this experiment, you will be randomly assigned a type by the computer, either 
‘Type A’, ‘Type B’, ‘Type C’ or ‘Type D’. Your type will remain the same 
throughout the whole experiment. In total there are 20 participants in this room; 
10% will be assigned the role of Type A, 40% will be assigned the role of Type B, 
40% of the participants will be assigned the role of Type C and the remaining 10% of 
the participants will be assigned the role of Type D. You will be informed of your 
type but not of the other participants’ types. 
At the beginning of the round, you will be matched with one other person, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of two. You will therefore 
be in a group with one other participant. You will never learn the identity of the other 
participant you are matched with, nor will the other participants be informed about 
your identity. 
 
 
The Decision Stage 
You and the other participant you are matched with have to simultaneously select 
one of two options, either OPTION X or OPTION Y. When you make your own 
choice, you do not know what the other participant’s choice is. Your type and the 
decisions made by both of you will determine the points you each get, as shown in the 
following tables. The first number in each cell indicates your points, and the second 
the other participant’s points.  
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Payoff tables for Type A: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  5	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  4.5	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  3.5	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  3	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
 
Payoff tables for Type B: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  5	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  4.5	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  3.5	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  3	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	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Payoff tables for Type C: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  5	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  4.5	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  3.5	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  3	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
 
Payoff tables for Type D: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  5	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  4.5	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  3.5	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  3	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
 
For example, suppose that you are Type A and the other participant you are matched 
with is Type B. If you choose OPTION X and they choose OPTION Y, then you will 
earn 10 points and the other participant will earn 3.5 points. 
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The Decision Screen  
You will enter your decisions on a screen that looks as follows. The example below is 
used for illustrative purposes. This screenshot corresponds to the case where you are 
Type A. In the actual experiment, you can be Type A, Type B, Type C or Type D as 
mentioned earlier in the instructions. 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, before you make your decision, you will be informed of your 
Type and the payoff tables for facing each type. You must select one of two options, 
either OPTION X or OPTION Y. To make your choice, you simply select the 
appropriate button and then click on the ‘Submit’ button by using your mouse. Once 
you have pressed the ‘Submit’ button, you can no longer revise your decision. 
 
Belief Elicitation 
On the next screen, you are asked to indicate which of the two options (OPTION X or 
OPTION Y) each type of the other person you could be matched with will choose. 
You will make your choices on a screen that looks as follows. 
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If you correctly estimate the actual choice made by the participant you are matched 
with, you will receive £2. 
 
Ending of the Experiment 
 
When both you and the other participant you are matched with have made your 
decisions, you will see a final screen reporting your type and your choice, the other 
participant’s type and their choice, the total points you have earned, the total points 
you have earned in £, your earnings from the belief elicitation, your show up fee, plus 
the corresponding final £ payment. You will be paid £1 for every point and £2 if you 
estimate the other participant’s choice correctly, in addition to your £2.50 show-up 
fee. 
Do you have any questions? Please do not ask any questions out loud. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. 
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Control Questions 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please complete the questions 
below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk to check your answers. 
Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the experiment will start. 
(The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for illustrative 
purposes. In the experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices 
of the participants.) 
 
1. Will your type change or remain the same throughout the experiment? (Please 
circle the correct answer). 
SAME / CHANGE 
 
2. How many ‘Type A’ participants are there in this experiment?     
………… 
 
3. If you are a ‘Type A’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type D’ participant and… 
 a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
4. If you are a ‘Type B’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION Y when matched with a ‘Type C’ participant and… 
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
5. If you are a ‘Type C’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type A’ participant and…  
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
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3.8 Appendix B 
 
Instructions with Communication (Experiment 1) 
	  
Preliminary Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory. This is an 
experiment in the economics of decision-making. The funding for this research has 
been provided by various research foundations. Just for showing up, you have already 
earned a show up fee of £2.50. You can earn additional money depending on the 
decisions made by you and other participants. It is very important that you read the 
instructions carefully. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of 
these rules. 
We will first go over the instructions together. After we have read the instructions, 
you will have time to ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any 
decisions you make in this experiment are completely anonymous. Please do not 
touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
The experiment consists of one round. You will be paid according to the number of 
points you have collected in that round with the following exchange rate: 
1 point = £1 
You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
Type and Matching 
In this experiment, you will be randomly assigned a type by the computer, either 
‘Type A’, ‘Type B’, ‘Type C’ or ‘Type D’. Your type will remain the same 
throughout the whole experiment. In total there are 20 participants in this room; 
10% will be assigned the role of Type A, 40% will be assigned the role of Type B, 
40% of the participants will be assigned the role of Type C and the remaining 10% of 
the participants will be assigned the role of Type D. You will be informed of your 
type but not of the other participants’ types. 
At the beginning of the round, you will be matched with one other person, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of two. You will therefore 
be in a group with one other participant. You will never learn the identity of the other 
participant you are matched with, nor will the other participants be informed about 
your identity. 
The round consists of two stages: i) the Recommendation stage and ii) the Decision 
stage.  
 
i) The Recommendation Stage 
 
On your screen, a message shall appear for 60 seconds, recommending you to choose 
OPTION X or OPTION Y. 
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The Recommendation is made by a Recommender. The Recommender knows the 
type of one participant in your group and it makes the Recommendation based on this 
knowledge. 
 
You will be informed of whether the Recommender knows your type or the other 
participant in your group’s type. If the Recommender knows the type is B or C, the 
Recommendation to ‘choose OPTION X’ is made. If it knows the type is A or D, the 
Recommendation to ‘choose OPTION Y’ is made. Both participants in your group 
can see the Recommendation. 
 
If you are advised to choose OPTION X, the following message will appear on your 
screen: 
 
The recommendation is to choose OPTION X. 
 
If you are advised to choose OPTION Y, the following message will appear on your 
screen: 
 
The recommendation is to choose OPTION Y. 
 
You do not have to choose the option that has been recommended in this stage. 
 
Once 60 seconds have elapsed, we will proceed to the ‘Decision stage’. 
 
ii) The Decision Stage 
You and the other participant you are matched with have to simultaneously select 
one of two options, either OPTION X or OPTION Y. When you make your own 
choice, you do not know what the other participant’s choice is. Your type and the 
decisions made by both of you will determine the points you each get, as shown in the 
following tables. The first number in each cell indicates your points, and the second 
the other participant’s points.  
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Payoff tables for Type A: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  5	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  4.5	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  3.5	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   5	  ,	  3	   10	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
 
Payoff tables for Type B: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  5	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  4.5	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  3.5	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   4.5	  ,	  3	   9.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	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Payoff tables for Type C: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  5	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  4.5	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  3.5	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3.5	  ,	  3	   8.5	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
 
Payoff tables for Type D: 	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  A:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  5	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  10	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  B:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  4.5	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  9.5	   9.5,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  C:	  	  	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  3.5	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8.5	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
	  Suppose	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  Type	  D:	  	   	   The	  Other	  Participant	  	   OPTION	  X	   OPTION	  Y	  You	   OPTION	  X	   3	  ,	  3	   8	  ,	  3.5	  OPTION	  Y	   3.5	  ,	  8	   9.5	  ,	  9.5	  
The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  indicates	  your	  points,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  other	  participant’s	  points.	  
 
For example, suppose that you are Type A and the other participant you are matched 
with is Type B. If you choose OPTION X and they choose OPTION Y, then you will 
earn 10 points and the other participant will earn 3.5 points. 
 
The Decision Screen  
You will enter your decisions on a screen that looks as follows. The example below is 
used for illustrative purposes. This screenshot corresponds to the case where you are 
Type A. In the actual experiment, you can be Type A, Type B, Type C or Type D as 
mentioned earlier in the instructions. 
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As mentioned before, before you make your decision, you will be informed of your 
Type and the payoff tables for facing each type. You must select one of two options, 
either OPTION X or OPTION Y. To make your choice, you simply select the 
appropriate button and then click on the ‘Submit’ button by using your mouse. Once 
you have pressed the ‘Submit’ button, you can no longer revise your decision. 
 
Belief Elicitation 
On the next screen, you are asked to indicate which of the two options (OPTION X or 
OPTION Y) each type of the other person you could be matched with will choose. 
You will make your choices on a screen that looks as follows. 
 
If you correctly estimate the actual choice made by the participant you are matched 
with, you will receive £2. 
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Ending of the Experiment 
 
When both you and the other participant you are matched with have made your 
decisions, you will see a final screen reporting your type and your choice, the other 
participant’s type and their choice, the total points you have earned, the total points 
you have earned in £, your earnings from the belief elicitation, your show up fee, plus 
the corresponding final £ payment. You will be paid £1 for every point and £2 if you 
estimate the other participant’s choice correctly, in addition to your £2.50 show-up 
fee. 
Do you have any questions? Please do not ask any questions out loud. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. 
 
Control Questions 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please complete the questions 
below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk to check your answers. 
Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the experiment will start. 
(The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for illustrative 
purposes. In the experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices 
of the participants.) 
 
1. Will your type change or remain the same throughout the experiment? (Please 
circle the correct answer). 
SAME / CHANGE 
 
2. How many ‘Type A’ participants are there in this experiment?     
………… 
 
3. If you are a ‘Type A’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type D’ participant and… 
 a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
4. If you are a ‘Type B’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION Y when matched with a ‘Type C’ participant and… 
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
 
5. If you are a ‘Type C’ participant, how many points would you receive by choosing 
OPTION X when matched with a ‘Type A’ participant and…  
a.) they choose Option X? ………… 
 b.) they choose Option Y? ………… 
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3.9 Appendix C  
 
Payoff Matrices in Experiment 1 
 
Payoff Tables for Type A 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
5, 5 
 
10, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 10 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
5, 4.5 
 
10, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 9.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
5, 3.5 
 
10, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
5, 3 
 
10, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
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Payoff Tables for Type B 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
4.5, 5 
 
9.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 10 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
4.5, 4.5 
 
9.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 9.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
4.5, 3.5 
 
9.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
4.5, 3 
 
9.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
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Payoff Tables for Type C 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
3.5, 5 
 
8.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 10 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
3.5, 4.5 
 
8.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 9.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
3.5, 3.5 
 
8.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
3.5, 3 
 
8.5, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
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Payoff Tables for Type D 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
3, 5 
 
8, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 10 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
3, 4.5 
 
8, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 9.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
3, 3.5 
 
8, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8.5 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
3, 3 
 
8, 3.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
3.5, 8 
 
 
9.5, 9.5 
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3.10 Appendix D 
 
Payoff Matrices in Experiment 2 
 
Payoff Tables for Type A 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
4, 4 
 
9, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 9 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
4, 3 
 
9, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 8 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
4, 2 
 
9, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 7 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type A 
 
Option X 
 
4, 1 
 
9, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 6 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
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Payoff Tables for Type B 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
3, 4 
 
8, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 9 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
3, 3 
 
8, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 8 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
3, 2 
 
8, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 7 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type B 
 
Option X 
 
3,1  
 
8, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 6 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
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Payoff Tables for Type C 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
2, 4 
 
7, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 9 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
2, 3 
 
7, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 8 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
2, 2 
 
7, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 7 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type C 
 
Option X 
 
2, 1 
 
7, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 6 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
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Payoff Tables for Type D 
 
  Type A 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
1, 4 
 
6, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 9 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type B 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
1, 3 
 
6, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 8 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
 
  Type C 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
1, 2 
 
6, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 7 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
 
   
Type D 
 
   
Option X 
 
 
Option Y 
 
 
 
Type D 
 
Option X 
 
1, 1 
 
6, 1.5 
 
 
Option Y 
 
1.5, 6 
 
 
8.5, 8.5 
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Conclusion 
 
This conclusion discusses the external validity of this thesis. It also includes the 
limitations of our study, a reminder of its policy implications and possible extensions 
to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
 
In Chapter 2, we investigated the impact that communication had on deescalating 
conflict. Consistent with the role of communication seen in our experiment, Reiter 
(1995) finds that leaders can prevent conflict by communicating if they understand 
the spiraling logic. The paper looks at a war in which a player attacks to forestall what 
they believe is an imminent attack on themselves, and in fact, the main empirical 
finding is that preemptive wars almost never happen. 
 
There are a few real-world examples of how fear has motivated an attack, for 
example, the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 and China’s intervention in the Korean War. 
Although, as with many studies on conflict, the causes are often inconclusive with 
many other motivations for war being possible. It is, therefore, difficult to provide 
empirical studies to compare our findings with.  
 
We investigate the impact that communication had on escalating conflict in Chapter 3. 
Walsh (2010) reported on how a provocative attack by a third party can trigger 
conflict. He stated that after a terrorist attack in Mumbai, Indian government officials 
identified the perpetrators as the ISI who were not controlled by Pakistan’s civilian 
government. 
 
Not only is it often difficult to identify the identity of provocateurs (whether they are 
third party or not) and their motives, it is also difficult to determine whether actions 
are truly strategic substitutes or complements. During the Cold War, there was much 
uncertainty on whether toughness would make the Soviet Union more or less 
aggressive. These are further reasons as to why it is difficult to find empirical studies 
for comparison. 
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Potential limitations of this research may be the sample size, particularly for Chapter 
3. Although the number of individual observations is larger than many other 
laboratory experiments, it is possible that a greater number of people may provide a 
more robust test of the differences across treatments. It would also be useful to 
conduct more treatments in both chapters, to distinguish whether communication by 
itself is responsible for our results, or whether the nature of the communication 
matters. It would be interesting to see the impact of one-way or fixed-form 
communication in Chapter 2 and, in Chapter 3, it would be interesting to investigate 
the effect of bi-lateral communication between the Recommender and the players, for 
example. 
 
Both chapters better enable us to analyse if information that would be used to reduce 
or increase the likelihood of conflict, particularly in the case of an arm’s race, can be 
generated via communication. In terms of policy implications, Chapter 2 may provide 
insight into whether formal agreements can be self-enforcing. Communication was 
successful in our experiment, suggesting that non-binding treaties may actually be 
effective. Chapter 3 could potentially contribute to tackling extremism. An improved 
understanding of extremist behaviour will help us to approach extremists in a variety 
of situations. Agents with extreme agendas (ideologues, such as lobby groups) 
sometimes take provocative actions to signal the intention of their leaders and these 
actions are able to inflame conflicts. A provocative recommender could also employ 
aggressive bargaining tactics during negotiations or they may be a person elected by 
voters, who want them to make aggressive actions on their behalf. Our research 
suggests that these signals/tactics/actions may not be the actual root of the escalation 
and the inflammation may be attributed to other factors such as those mentioned in 
Chapter 1. 
 
There are a number of extensions for our research. In Chapter 2, we could investigate 
the impact of one-sided communication, repeated interaction with multiple rounds and 
the differences that may occur when incorporating an Endowment effect. Players have 
been shown to behave differently when facing a reduction of their earnings 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990), which may actually be more similar to the 
cost they would be affected by if the situations we created within our experiments had 
existed in real life. In Chapter 3, it would be interesting to see the effect of a third-
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party pacifist. Furthermore, we could run the experiments but with the payoffs such 
that it becomes a Strategic Substitutes game to see if a peaceful ideologue can bring a 
reduction in Hawkish actions. 
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